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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN AMERICAN
AND GERMAN LAW - LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS
AND ENTITIES: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States legal doctrine of "corporate veil" refers to the common
concept of limited corporate liability under which the shareholders of a corporate
entity are not personally liable for the entity's debts and obligations.' Similarly,
the concept applies to limited liability companies2 (LLCs) that have emerged in
recent years. 3 However, it is accepted and recognized that under particular
circumstances the rule of limited liability will be abolished4 in favor of the
corporation's creditors. 5 This process is commonly referred to as piercing or
lifting the veil or disregarding the entity. 6 Today, there is no distinction
between corporations and LLCs with respect to piercing the veil.7
German corporate law has a similar rule of general limited liability
regarding obligations of an Aktiengesellschaft, stock corporation, and a
Gesellschaft mit beschraenkterHaftung (GmbH), which is similar to a limited
liability company.' There exists a wide body of cases and literature which focus
on when limited
liability may be disregarded. 9 This is referred to as "Durch'
griffshaftung."'

1. E.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 6.22, 2.02(b)(2)(v) (1994) [hereinafter RMBCAJ. See
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (1992); Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing The Corporate
Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 2 (1978).
2. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.057 (Vernon Supp. 1994); Mark A. Sargent, Limited Liability Company
Handbook § 1.03 (1993-94 ed.).
3. For an overview on LLCs see Sargent, supra note 2, at 1-7, 7-1; Michael Bosko, The Best of Both
Worlds: The Limited Liability Company, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 181 (1993).
4. HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS Ch. X (rev. ed. 1946); 1 WiLLIAM M.
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990);
HENRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 146-48 (3d ed. 1983); STEPHEN B.
PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.01 (1991).

5. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89, 109 (1985); Harvey Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil - The UndercapitalizationFactor,59 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1982); Robert B. Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1039 (1991) [hereinafter Thompson 1991]; Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability:
Direct and Vicarious Liability of CorporateParticipantsfor Torts of the Enterprise,47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3,
5 (1994) [hereinafter Thompson 1994].
6. Professor Wormser was the first to use the term. See infra part H.A.l.
7. Sargent, supra note 2, at 4-7; Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability
Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L.REV. 387, 401-03 (1991); Robert R. Keatinge etal., The Limited Liability
Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 442 & nn.536-57 (1992).
8. See AKTIENGESETZ [AktG] § 1, para. 1; GMBH-GESETZ [GmbHG] § 13, para. 2. Both provisions
expressly state that only the assets of an entity are liable to creditors of the entity.
9. See HACHENBURG GROBKOMMENTAR, GESELLSCHAFrEN Mrr BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG) Anh.
§ 13, at 573-74 (Ulmer ed., 8th ed. 1992); KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 186 (1991) [hereinafter
SCHMIDT, GEsELLR]; FRANZ SCHOLZ, KoMMENTAR ZUM GMBH-GESETZ § 13, B., In., para. 4 (6th ed. 1983).

10. ADOLF BAUMBACH & ALFRED HUECK, GMBH-GESmT § 13, mno. 10 (15th ed. 1988); Helmut Coing,
Zum Problem des Sogenannten Durchgriffs bei Juristischen Personen, 1977 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
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Incorporation for the sole purpose of obtaining limited liability under the
law of corporations or other entities is legitimate, and there are no grounds for
the denial of any benefits connected with the principle of limited liability."
Accordingly, rules of piercing the veil, or Durchgriffshaftungoperating in favor
of a corporate creditor who seeks personal liability of a corporation's sharehold-3
12
ers or members of a LLC, can be applied only in exceptional cases.'
Furthermore, the doctrines have been promulgated in both countries by the courts
and legal scholars and have no statutory basis.
German corporate law, in the context of affiliated entities, has a rather
different approach to the issue of disregarding an entity's veil of limited liability.
Here, the shareholders of an entity are other entities. Because of the different
underlying circumstances, 4 these situations have to be clearly distinguished
from the fact patterns just mentioned in which the shareholders are individuals.
The basic rules determining the question of shareholder liability when the
shareholders are other entities are embodied in the German corporate law code,
AktG sections 15-19 and 291-328." The German legal term most used in this
context is "Konzem," which is defined in AktG section 18.6 Accordingly, this
area of law is often referred to as "Konzernrecht." These terms will be used
subsequently in the context of German law.
In contrast, the American law extends the equitable rules of piercing the veil
to situations involving affiliated entities. As mentioned, the counterpart in
German law is found in the legal notion referred to as Durchgriffshaftung which
is applied to entities with individual shareholders. Accordingly, with respect to
the question of shareholder liability, German law can serve as an example that
has both equitable rules and statutory provisions, which are distinct from each
other.
This paper compares rules for disregarding the principle of limited liability.
Its primary focus is on affiliated entities. However, for the purpose of

SCHRIFr [NJW] 1793; HACIENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.no. 1; MARCUS LuTrER & PETER
HOMMELHOFF, GMBH-GESETZ: KOMMENTAR § 13, m.no. 8 (13th ed. 1991); SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note
9, at 200-301.
11. New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983); HENN, supra note 4,§ 146.
12. This paperrefers to the equity owners of a corporation or an LLC by the American legal terms,
"shareholder" for corporations, e.g., RMIBCA § 1.40 (22) and "member" for limited liability companies, e.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.015 (11). The German terms are "Aktionaer" (AktG § 28) and "Gesellschafter"
(GmbHG § 2, para. 2).
13. Krendl, supra note 1, at 7; SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 187.
14. Corporate shareholders are not mere passive investors, but combine ownership of an entity with
control. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of MultinationalCorporations, 15 DEL. J.
CoRP.L. 283, 298, 325-27 (1990) [hereinafter Blumberg, CorporateEntity].
15. Particularly important are §§ 302, 303, and 317. See SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 203;
HACHENBURO, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.no. 47, Anh. § 30, m.nos. 30, 33; Ulrich Htlbner, Der Durchgriff
bei Juristischen Personen irmEuropaischenGesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht, 1978 JURISTEN ZEITUNG
[JZ] 703, 706; HEINz ROWEDDER, GMBHG: KOMMENTAR § 13, m.no. 30 (2d ed. 1990); Walter Stimpel,
Durchgriffstatbestaendebei der GmbH: Tatbestaende, Verlustausgleich, Ausfallhaftung, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
GOERDELER 603, 609 (1987). The rules are described in detail in the chapters on affiliated entities. Cf.infra
part IV.B.3.b.ii to IV.B.3.c.
16. AktG §§ 291-28 are applicable to affiliated companies, which are defined in AktG §§ 15-19. Cf.infra
part IV.B.3.b.ii.
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understanding the American law and the different approaches taken by the two
legal systems, it is necessary to first delineate the rules in general before
describing the situation respecting parent-subsidiary companies.
With regard to non-corporate shareholders, this paper makes clear that under
both American and German law, piercing the veil becomes an issue in situations
involving: (1) domination of a company, (2) undercapitalization of a company,
and (3) commingling of the shareholder's and the company's assets or other
disregard of corporate formalities. Contrary to the patterns regarding affiliated
entities, it will be seen that the approaches in both jurisdictions are rather similar.
This paper distinguishes between individual and corporate shareholders.
The rules in general and parent-subsidiary situations in particular are dealt with
in separate sections.
II.

A.

THEORIES AND APPROACHES TO PIERCING THE VEIL

American Law

1. General
The term "piercing the veil" was first coined by Professor Wormser in
1912." However, the principle of limited liability" may be traced further
back, although no exact date is available.' 9 For example, Massachusetts
enacted five different statutes regulating shareholder liability between 1809 and
1830,20 and by that time, the principle of limited liability was widely recognized in the United States.21 In the early case of Wood v. Dummer,22 the court
approved the principle of limited liability. The shareholders of an incorporated
bank withdrew all the assets of the entity by distributing extensive dividends,
thereby leaving the creditors without any available funds. The court viewed the
previously paid-in capital as a trust fund for the benefit of the bank's creditors
and held the shareholders responsible for paying off their entity's debts up to the
amount of dividends each of them had received.
In the early development of corporate law, courts were reluctant to award
damages against corporations, and consequently, the veil was rarely lifted. An
example of this is the 18th Century Mill Acts in New England, which stated that
owners of land adjacent to mills could not claim damages if their property was
flooded as a result of water storage and discharge. Although the statutes were

17. I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of CorporateEntity, 12 COLuM. L. REV. 496 (1912); see infra
part H.A.2.

18. For an historical overview, see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J.
CoRP. L. 574, 577-605 (1986) [hereinafter Blumberg, Limited Liability]; see also id at 587-95 (describing
American law).
19. David S. Baker & V. Scott Killingsworth, An American View through the Corporate Veil, 6 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 267 (1978); Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 292.
20. Baker, supra note 19, at 268.
21. William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, ShareholderLiabilityfor Inadequate Capital,43 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 837, 847 (1982); Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 9.
22. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944); Baker, supra note 19, at 268; Blumberg, Limited
Liability, supra note 18, at 592; Hackney, supra note 21, at 848.
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initially aimed at small-scale mills of the colonial time, they were also later
applied to mill factories that flooded large tracts of land.2"
In approaching the problem of individual shareholder liability, it should first
be noted that the courts developed, almost entirely, this area of law,' and
therefore, uniform rules do not exist.25 This situation has often been lamented
by scholars. The lack of uniformity led Judge Cardozo to comment in Berkey
v. Third Ave. Railway Co. that "the whole problem of the relations between
parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of
metaphor."2 6 Arthur Machen stated that, with respect to this legal problem, "no
other guide is more desirable than sturdy common sense."'27 Additionally,
Professor Latty wrote, "what the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage
about control, instrumentality, agency and corporate entity, is that liability is
imposed to reach an equitable result."'
Although theories have been developed, as will be discussed, Judge Sanborn
summarized the approach in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co.29 and described an approach to the problem:
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used

to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,3 or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons.

Before the focus is turned in depth to the issue of piercing the veil, piercing
the veil must be distinguished from other situations in which owners of an entity
may be held liable.3 1 For example, a shareholder may have committed tortious
acts or may have incurred an individual obligation, rather than one of the entity,
by causing a creditor to believe that he or she acted in his or her individual
capacity and not on behalf of the company. 32 These cases will not be decided
based upon the corporate rules of piercing the veil because the shareholder
incurred an individual liability. In contrast, piercing the veil applies to an
entity's obligations for which the creditor seeks the personal liability of the

owner.33 However, piercing the veil does not generally question the legal

23. MORTON J. HORwrr7, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 47-53 (1977); Baker,
supra note 19, at 269.
24. Today, federal statutes exist which impose liability, especially in the context of corporate groups. See
Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 288-89, 298, 329-45, 355-59; cf.infra notes 566-67.
25. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973);
FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.30; Baker, supra note 19, at 269; Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Comment, The Alter
Ego Doctrine:Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 UCLA L. REV. 129, 139 (1982).
26. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). For more details on this case see infra part I.A.2. PRESSER, supra note

4, § 1.03.
27.
(1911).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Baker, supra note 19, at 270; Arthur W. Machen, Jr., CorporatePersonality,24 HARV. L. REV. 253
ELVIN R. LATrY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936).
142 F.2d 247, 255 (Wis. 1905); HENN, supra note 4, at 346.
142 F.2d at 255.
Krendl, supra note 1, at 2-3.
HENN, supra note 4, § 146.
ld.;
Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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fiction of an entity's separate existence apart from the owners, but merely
disregards this fiction for the purpose of the particular case at bar.3'
2. Theories
One of the approaches that has evolved is Professor Berle's enterprise entity
theory.35 Professor Berle saw a contradiction between economic reality and the
legal organization of a business split into several separate entities held together
by the parent corporation. Consequently, he stated that the parent should not
only be liable for the subsidiary's debts, but also for all of the comprised assets
available to a creditor of any of the enterprise's corporations.36 This comes
close to the German Konzernrecht according to which a dominating shareholder
under
certain circumstances generally has to assume the debts of the subsid37
iary.
One illustration is the well-known New York taxi-cab cases. The owners
of many cabs incorporated only pairs of their cabs that could not be distinguished from each other.38 Obviously, the shareholders tried to avoid having
the liability incurred by the use of one cab from extending to all the other cabs
in the fleet by incorporating in pairs. Individually, the cabs carried only the
minimum amount of third-party insurance, which was often not sufficient to meet
obligations incurred.
The courts rejected Berle's enterprise entity theory in the famous case of
Berkey v. Third Ave. Railway Co. 39 In this case, a parent corporation owned
several subsidiaries that operated a railway transportation system in Manhattan.
The court refused to impose shareholder liability in favor of the plaintiff who as
a passenger on one of the subsidiaries' streetcars, had been negligently
injured. 4° In Walkovszky v. Carlton,4" another taxi-cab case, the court referred
to Berle and concluded that, at most, liability could be extended to the enterprise
not to the individual shareholders. However, given the words of the court, it is
evident that even in this case, the court drew its conclusion from factors such as
undercapitalization and intermingling of the corporation's affairs, rather than
solely from artificially fragmenting an enterprise by incorporating its parts.42

34. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORIORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACr, AND OTHER COMMON
LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 130-32 (1987)
[hereinafter BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW]; Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 290.

35. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
36. As Berle stated, "the court may assign the liabilities of the paper fragment to the economic whole."
Id at 354. See Baker, supra note 19, at 271; Krendl, supra note 1, at 15.

37. See infra part IV.B.3.b.ii to IV.B.3.c.
38. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Teller v. Clear Service Co., 173 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., Inc.,

286 N.Y.S. 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936). A good description of these cases is provided in Teller, 173 N.Y.S.2d
at 187-90.
39. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
40. Judge Cardozo's result might have been influenced by the fact that personal shareholder liability

would implicitly have subjected the shareholder to criminal prosecution and fines. Id. at 60; PRESSER, supra
note 4, § 1.03, at 1-19 to 1-20; Krendl, supra note 1, at 10.
41. 223 N.E.2d at 8, 10.
42. Id. at 10.
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Most other theories, as opposed to Professor Berle's enterprise entity theory,
focus on the creditor's point of view. For example, Professor Wormser stated
that the legal fiction of a corporation's separate existence is a state-conferred
privilege that can be used only for legitimate purposes within its reasons and
policies.4 3 Accordingly, the veil should be pierced to achieve justice and to
prevent shareholders from evading their legal obligations. Furthermore, Wormser
believed the rules for disregarding this privilege could not be confined to
statutory regulations because of the complexity of the relations involved."
Professor Wormser's thoughts may have come close to acceptance in
California. Courts in California are believed to peirce the veil more readily than
in other jurisdictions. 41 The courts apply a two-prong test,46 commonly
referred to as the "alter ego" doctrine.4 7 This test requires: (1) a unity of
interest between the shareholders and their entity so that a separation of them no
longer exists and (2) an inequitable result would follow if the acts objected to
by the creditors were only treated as those of the corporation.
A somewhat similar approach is taken by Professor Powell, who suggests
applying a three-prong test, generally called the "instrumentality rule."' This
rule was adopted for the first time in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.49
The requirements of Powell's test are (1) control or complete domination of an
entity, (2) fraud or wrong committed by the use of this control or domination,
and (3) injury or loss suffered by the plaintiff caused by the aforesaid act.5"
The test was originally developed for parent-subsidiary situations, but many
courts apply it to other situations involving the domination of an entity."
Powell also offered a list of eleven key-factors5 2 to assist in determining
when a corporate veil may be lifted. Other factors have been subsequently
added. 3 Common features among these additional factors allow them to be
grouped into three fact patterns. These are situations of control or domination,

43. I. MAURICE WoRMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION
PROBLEMS 8-9 (1927); PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-24.

44. PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-26; WORMSER, supra note 43, at 37-38.
45. PRESSER, supra note 4, § 2.05, at 2-34.
46. E.g., Automotriz del Golfo de California S. A. de C. V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957);

Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
47.

BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.03.

48. PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-27; FREDERICK POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY 4-6 (1931).
49. 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936). See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238 (2d
Cir. 1960); BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 112.
50. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.02, at 112-17; Krendl, supra note 1, at 15-22.
51. Krendl, supra note 1, at 24-27. "Stock ownership, however, is not an absolute requirement for
piercing the veil.... [T]he dominant party must have some beneficial interest in the subservient corporation."

Id. at 24.
52.

PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-29; Krendl, supra note 1, at 16-17.

53. See Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); PRESSER, supra note 4, § 2.05, at 2-27; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, PARENT-AFFILIATE RELATIONS

AND RESPONSIBLITmEs 193, 195 (1993) [hereinafter WIR 1993].
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undercapitalization, and commingling of assets or disregard of corporate
formalities. It is within these contexts where issues of piercing the veil arise.'
3. Summary
The doctrines of alter ego and instrumentality are the tests applied by most
courts today and are often viewed as interchangeable. 5 Both of these tests
have the common elements of control and fraud (injustice or unfairness
perpetrated on the creditor). These elements are prevalent where domination,
undercapitalization, commingling of assets, or disregard of corporate formalities
appear. However, the existence of one of these criteria alone is often not
sufficient to justify piercing the veil. 6 For example, most courts will refer to
undercapitalization with respect to the element of fraud, wrongdoing, or injustice.
Likewise, domination and commingling of assets or disregard of corporate
formalities might establish the factor of control of an entity as the first prong."
In contrast to the alter ego doctrine, the instrumentality rule has an
additional element of causation" regarding the loss suffered by the creditor.
Insolvency of the debtor company may demonstrate this causation. However,
insolvency is present in most cases involving the issue of piercing the veil,
otherwise, the indebted entity would be able to meet its obligations. Accordingly, the courts generally do not include this element.5 9
B.

German law

1. General
After an extensive elaboration by Rolf Serick, the term Durchgriffshaftung
was discussed emphatically by many commentators.'n However, the courts had
previously recognized that in certain circumstances a company's separate entity
should be disregarded. 6' Various legal scholars, in their discussions of the past

54. Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560,564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Thompson 1994, supra
note 5, at 9.
55. Consumer's Co-Op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211,217-18 (Wis. 1988); BLUMBERG,
SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.01, at 11.
56. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349,362 (1944); BLUMBERG, SUBsTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.03,
at 122; PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.05, at 1-44 to 1-45; Krendl, supra note 1, at 22. "[T]here appears to be
no single determinative factor," accordingly, it is not appropriate to regard the factor of undercapitalization as
a distinct doctrine, but rather as an important factor. IL at 22.
57. Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 524
(9th Cir. 1984); Consumer's Co-op, 419 N.W.2d at 217.
58. Causation is not required by those courts using the two-prong alter ego test. See Vuitch v. Furr, 482
A.2d 811, 816, 820 (D.C. 1984).
59. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.02, at 117.
60.

ROLF SERICK, RECHTSFORM UND REALrAT JURISTISCHER PERSoNEN (1980). See HACHENBURO, supra

note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.no. 27; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 190; infra part II.B.1.
61. Both the Reichsgericht (RG), and its successor the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), recognized that a
seperate entity could be disregarded in numerous cases. See Judgment of Oct. 22, 1987, BGH, 102
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtsofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 95, 103; Judgment of Nov. 7, 1957, BGH, 26
BGHZ 31, 37; Judgment of Jan. 30, 1956, BGH, 20 BGHZ 4, 11; Judgment of July 3, 1953, BGH, 10 BGHZ
205, 207; Judgment of Nov. 30, 1937, RG, 156 Entscheidungen des Reichsgenrichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 271,
277; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1921, RG, 103 RGZ 64, 66; Judgment of June 22, 1920, RG, 99 RGZ 232, 234.
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thirty-five years, have not provided specific requirements as to when a
company's veil may be lifted. Mainly they have attempted to give a dogmatic
justification for the imposition of liability on the owners of an entity.62
As in American law, 63 there are many situations where a company's
limited liability is disregarded on other legal grounds than that of piercing the
veil.' This occurs where the behavior of an equity owner creates his or her
individual liability.65 For example, an entity's owner may be personally liable
as a surety or guarantor for the entity's obligations. Alternatively, he or she
may have concluded a contract in an individual capacity, rather than as
shareholder or member of an entity.' Also, an entity's owner may be liable
under the statutory provisions regarding civil torts if a creditor incurred
detriments inflicted by tortious acts of the owner.67
Durchgriffshaftung refers to situations not governed by statutory or other
legal rules in which an entity's existence is disregarded and the owner is held
individually liable for the obligations of the company." This does not negate
the legal entity itself even if the veil is pierced.69
In general, owners will be individually liable for the company's debts only
if bankruptcy proceedings are commenced.7" Accordingly, Durchgriffshaftung
is commonly understood as a complementary and ultima-ratio liability of a
shareholder.7 ' From a creditor's point of view, a shareholder's individual
liability resulting from piercing the veil does not become relevant until the debtor
company faces financial hardship. Only under such a condition will the facts
leading to a shareholder's liability typically become evident.
The federal Bundesgerichtshofis the highest court in civil matters. Germany has one jurisdiction consisting
of courts on a state level (Amtsesgericht, Landesgericht,and Oberlandesgericht)and the federal BGH.
62. See infra parts ll.B.I to ll.B.2.
63. See supra part II.A.I.
64. Judgment of Dec. 14,1959, BGH, 31 BGHZ 258, 271; Case Comment, 1977 NJW 1683. In this case,
the court referred to several possible theories under which the plaintiff was seeking the defendant's personal
liability. Id. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.nos. 3-18; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no.
25; SCHOLZ, supra note 9, § 13, m.nos. 26-35; ScHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9. at 194-99; Rudolf Nirk, Zur
Rechtsfolgenseite der Durchgriffshaftung, in FEsTsCHRIFr FOR WALTER MSIMEL 449-54 (1985).
65. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 14; HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 25-34;
ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, neno 25.
66. Where an owner or shareholder does not make clear that he or she acts on behalf of the entity, legal
theories such as venire contra factum proprium or culpa in contrahendo may be applied. See PALANDTHEINRICHS, BORGERLIcHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 242, m.nos. 55-57, § 276, m.nos. 65-103 (50th ed. 1991).
67. Id §§ 823-826. For example. in Architekten, 1979 NJW 2104, the Bundesgerichtshofimposedpersonal
liability on the defendant as the sole member and owner of a GmbH & Co.KG (a Co.KG is a limited
partnership with a GmbH as a general partner. A limited partnership is referred to as a Kommanditgesellschaft
(KG). HANDELsGESETZBUCH [HGB) § 161. In Architekten, the Co.KG was inadequately capitalized. See infra
note 173 and accompanying text.
68. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 10; Hflbner, supra note 15, at 703; LUTrER, supra note 10,
§ 13, m.no. 8; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no. 24; SCHOLZ, supra note 9, § 13, m.no. 36.
69. SCHMIDr, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 190, 194.
70. HACHENBURG, supra note 9. at Anh. § 30, m.no. 61; Case Comment, 1986 NJW 188, 192 [hereinafter
Autokran, 1986 NJW 188]. This case is referred to as Autokran and is explained in more detail in the chapter
on German Konzernrecht, infra note 510 and accompanying text. It involved the question of personal liability
of the owner of 7 GmbHs that were dominated by him and that all were bankrupt. These GmbHs, therefore,
were not able to pay debts owed to the plaintiff. Id
71. Nirk, supra note 64, at 461-62.
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Theories

a. Commentators: Serick, Rehbinder, and Miller-Freienfels
Among commentators,72 the most cited scholars are Serick,73 MdllerFreienfels, 74 and Rehbinder. 75 However, they do not state prerequisites as to
when shareholder liability can be imposed. Instead they offer dogmatic
justifications if the legal entity is disregarded.
According to Serick, a shareholder or member of an entity may be
personally liable where the entity's form has been abused, if the individual, for
example, tries to circumvent statutory or contractual obligations or fraudulently
causes damages to third parties.7 6 Consequently, the theory subjectively
requires an act of bad faith. A suggested alternative is to focus only on the
owner's ascertainable behavior regardless of his intent. 7
Miiller-Freienfels, on the other hand, focuses on particular statutory
provisions: here, AktG section 1, paragraph 1, and GmbHG section 13, paragraph
2, that embody the principle of limited liability. He suggests denying application
of these sections if the underlying purposes are frustrated.78 This theory
reduces the application of code provisions under certain circumstances and does
so regardless of the shareholder's subjective intent.79
Rehbinder's
Rehbinder's theory comes close to Mtiller-Freienfels'.
dogmatic justification for impositing shareholder liability is that separation of an
entity and its owners would violate the legal system in general.8 0
These theories are quite similar. They differ from each other, mainly with
respect to a defendant's subjective intent and whether piercing the veil requires
an intentional wrongdoing.
b. Courts
The judiciary"' normally does not adhere to any one of the above
mentioned theories.8 2 The courts express reluctance to disregard the principle of
limited liability. 3 A subjective theory of abuse, as represented by Serick, was

72. Helmut Haberlandt, Zur Problematik der Durchgriffshaftung - Identitaet und Durchgriff, 1980
BETRiEBS-BERATER 847, 848; Htibner, supra note 15, at 704; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 190-91;
Nirk, supra note 64, at 455.
73. SERICK, supra note 60.
74. Wolfram Mfiller-Freienfels, Zur Lehre vom sogenannten Durchgriff bei juristischen Personen im
Privatrecht,in ARCHiV FOR DIE CIVlLISTISCHE PRAxIS 522 (1957).
75. ECKARD REHBINDER, KONZERNAUSSENREcHI' UND ALLGEMEINES PRIVATRECHr 85-130 (1969); Eckard
Rehbinder, Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Durchgriff im Gesellschaftsrecht, in FEssCHRIFr FOR ROBERT
FISCHER 579, 579-603 (1979).
76. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 190; SCHOLZ, supra note 9, § 13, m.no. 20.
77. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 191.
78. Id.; HACHENBuRG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 38; Hibner, supra note 15, at 704, 709; SCHOLZ,
supra note 9, § 13, m.no. 24.
79. Coing, supra note 10, at 1794, 1796.
80.

SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 191.

81. For an overview of the decisions, see SCHOLZ, supra note 9, § 13 m.nos. 16, 17.
82. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 11.
83. Id.
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rejected because of its narrow focus." The Reichsgericht, as the predecessor
of the Bundesgerichtshof,5 held that a shareholder and his company must be
treated as one entity if, in reality, the economic needs and the facts force the
judge to ignore the independence of the entity (discussing a GmbH) and its sole
The Bundesgerichtshof held that the corporate entity can be
member. 8
respected only when its use is consistent with the goals of the legal system.'
It may be disregarded only in exceptional cases if required by serious reasons of
equity and good faith."8
3. Summary
The general statements of the courts are not very conclusive, but they make
clear that piercing the veil is decided on a case by case basis.8 9 Consequently,
it is commonly agreed that the term Durchgriffshaftung does not represent a
particular doctrine of law, rather it refers to the problem of personal liability,
despite the principle of limited liability as laid down in AktG section 1,
paragraph 1, and GmbHG section 13, paragraph 2.9o
However, as in American law, various fact patterns have evolved. Today
it is recognized that they are characterized by either: (1) domination, (2)
undercapitalization, or (3) commingling of assets or disregard of corporate
formalities. 9' With respect to the first category, German law has specific
statutory provisions relating to liabilities within a group of companies, a
Konzern, which are distinct from the rules of piercing the veil.
III.
A.

PIERCING THE VEIL - INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS

Domination of a Company

1. General
Initially, this section investigates whether domination and control justify
disregard of the general principle of limited liability. Domination and control

84. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1956, BGH, 20 BGHZ 4, 13.
85. See supra note 61.
86. Judgment of June 22, 1920, RG, 99 RGZ 232, 236.
87. 20 BGHZ 4, 14.
88. Case Comment, 1977 NJW 1449, 1449 (citing other court decisions) [hereinafter 1977 NJW 1449].
See also infra note 178. In Typenhaus, the plaintiff had delivered glass to a GmbH which was in the
construction business. The GmbH was formed by the defendant company as sole member and defaulted on the
payments. The court refused to pierce the veil for the sole reason of undercapitalization. 1977 NJW 1449,
1450. However, this decision of the court's eigth panel was highly criticized. The second panel, which is
normally competent in this area, also criticized the decision. Case Comment, 1977 NJW 1683, 1686
[hereinafter 1977 NJW 1683].
89. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 10; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no 22; SCHOLZ, supra
note 9, § 13, m.no. 17; Nirk, supra note 64, at 456-57.
90.

BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 10; HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.nos. 1, 37;

SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 193-94; SCHOLZ, supra note 9, § 13, m.no. 25; Nirk, supra note 64, at
453.
91. LurrER, supranote 10, § 13, m.nos. 9-14; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 200; Nirk, supranote
64, at 453-54; Karsten Schmidt, Zur Durchgriffsfestigkeit der GmbH, 1994 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrsREcrr 837, 838 (1994) [hereinafter Schmidt, Zur Durchgriffsfestigkeit];Stimpel, supra note 15, at 607-10.
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are certainly the most obvious factors in determining the question of piercing an
entity's veil. Thus, both are part of the alter ego and the instrumentality rule.92
Control of an entity can occur in two ways. First, one or more individuals
may dominate a company by being the sole or majority owners. Second, an
entity may be part of a group of affiliated companies, where it is dominated as
a so-called subsidiary by another company, usually named the parent, holding all
or the majority of the stock of the subsidiary. Situations involving parentsubsidiary companies are the main focus of this paper and are described in detail
in a separate section.93 The following pages scrutinize the issue of piercing the
veil in the context of individuals as owners of an entity.
2. American law
Courts and commentators generally agree that an individual's mere
domination of an entity does not justify disregarding limited liability obtained
This is also true with respect to one-shareholder
under corporate law.'
corporations, 95 which are not regarded as being against public policy.96
Therefore, piercing the veil occurs only if additional factors are shown to a
court. 97 Following the approach of the alter ego and the instrumentality
doctrines that are applied in most jurisdictions,9" the legal entity will only be
disregarded upon the further proof of fraud, inequity, or the like. This may be
indicated where a corporation is undercapitalized or conducted on an individual
basis rather than a corporate basis, where the shareholders commingle personal
and corporate assets or neglect corporate formalities.
Although incorporation by one or just a few shareholders is legitimate, the
issue of piercing the veil becomes relevant, aside from parent-subsidiary
situations, only in the context of one-shareholder or closely held corporations."
The closeness of management and control of an entity in these contexts makes
it much easier for the shareholders to manipulate their entity's conduct.
Additionally, they are not controlled by other equity owners and may be more
inclined to disregard the interests of the subsidiary and creditors. Conversely,
shareholders in public corporations are usually passive investors, not involved in
the management of the entity. No case is known in which the legal entity fiction
of a public corporation has been lifted with liability imposed on the passive
shareholders. 1°°

92. Krendl, supra note 1, at 25-27.
93. Cf. part I.D.
94. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 6.02, at 114; HENN, supra note 4, § 147, at 353;
Gelb, supra note 5, at 8-9.
95. See, e.g., RMBCA § 2.01 (allowing incorporation by only one person).
96. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Pollak Indus., Inc., 382 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); BALLANTINE,
supra note 4, § 128.

97.
98.
99.
100.

FLEiCHER, supra note 4, § 41.35; HENN, supra note 4, § 147.
See supra part Il.A.2.
Thompson 1991, supra note 5, at 1039, 1047.
Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 289; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 109-10.
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3. German law
Domination of an entity by its owners occurs where sole or majority
ownership is found. Sole domination, however, is not permitted under AktG
section 2, which requires a minimum of five shareholders for incorporation. On
the contrary, sole ownership is often found in a GmbH subject to the pertaining
1 2
provisions,1 ° where there is no longer a dispute regarding its legality.
Sole or majority ownership alone does not justify disregard of the principle
of limited liability, 0 3 even where the owner as Geschaeftsfuehrer'° is also
managing the company.'0 5 On the other hand, abuse of the legal entity fiction
to the detriment of the entity's creditors' will presumably occur more often under
these circumstances because there is no mutual control by the owners.
Although the rules of piercing the veil do not differentiate between the
number of an entity's owners, in reality they are applied more successfully to
sole ownership entities. In this context, relevant factors such as undercapitalization and commingling of assets, as mentioned above, carries more weight." 6
Nonetheless, disregarding the legal entity will be permitted only if other factors,
such as those described in the following chapters, can be attached to the entity
owners' conduct.
B.

Undercapitalization
1.

American law

a. General
American courts and legal scholars often state that undercapitalization is a
very important factor in determining whether or not to pierce an entity's veil of
limited liability. 7 Undercapitalization is most often mentioned in connection

101. For example, GmbHG § I expressly states that one or several persons can be members of a GmbH.
102. Formerly, one-member GmbHs were criticized by some authors. Cf SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note
9, at 1020-21.
103. LUTrER, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 14; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 203.
104. See GmbHG § 35, para. 1 ; see also infra note 411.
105. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1034.
106. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no. 24.
107. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc.,
878 F.2d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989). McCracken v. Olson Co., 500 N.E.2d 487, 491, 492 (III. App. Ct.
1986). The plaintiff tax attorney pierced the veil after he performed legal services for the corporation. The
defendant was the sole owner of the corporation and was engaged in seventeen corporations with assets totaling
$75 million. However, the debtor corporation was capitalized with only $1,000,000 and the defendant had
commingled personal and corporate assets and had disregarded corporate formalities. Id Gallagher v. Reconco
Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 564-654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) The court pierced the veil where the sole owner
of a corporation having assets of no more than $1,000 violated obligations amounting to about $31,000 arising
out of a construction contract with the plaintiff and the corporation. The court found corporate formalities had
been disregarded and as to the element of unfairness, it was sufficient that the defendant had made false
financial statements to other creditors in order to obtain more funds. Id Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Pollack Indus.,
Inc., 382 N.E.2d 393, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M. A. Bell Co., 588 P.2d 463,
473, 475 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978); LATTY, supra note 28, at 120, 121; Gelb, supra note 5, at 2, 3; Hackney,
supra note 21, at 859; Krendl, supra note 1, at 34-38; Thompson 1991, supra note 5, at 1065; see infra part
Il.B.2.d.
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with the prong requiring a showing of fraud, injustice, or unfairness.) ° The
undercapitalization factor is especially relevant since most states have no
statutory minimum stated capital, thus leaving piercing the veil as the only
protection for corporate creditors." ° However, the statutes' silence on this
issue does not mean that inadequate capitalization is tolerated or without any
impact."" It is recognized that insufficient capitalization is a problem beyond
the capacity of statutes. Accordingly, a minimum stated capital is not prescribed
in most jurisdictions.
Furthermore, mere undercapitalization alone is not sufficient to justify
piercing the veil."' In the various theoretical approaches," 2 it generally is
necessary from a creditor's point of view to show some fraud, injustice,
unfairness, or wrongdoing on the part of the corporate defendant.'
Thus,
there has to be a misuse of the corporate form that may be shown by a
shareholder's misrepresentation as to his corporation's capital." 4
An additional reason for requiring elements beyond undercapitalization may
be that corporate law generally permits investor shareholders to limit their
liability, whereas a theory of piercing the veil subjects the shareholders to
unlimited liability. "' Accordingly, the shareholders are not only liable to the
extent of their investment, which might justify personal liability solely for the
reason of undercapitalization. In contrast, by applying rules of piercing the veil
the owner will be liable for the full amount owed by the company; this liability
is not limited by the amount of his investment capital.
A situation, although similar to piercing the veil, must be clearly distinguished. This situation arises when a shareholder has made a loan to the
corporation or has any other claim against the company. This claim will be
subordinated to other corporate creditors in bankruptcy proceedings if the
corporation is undercapitalized." 6 This is true where the shareholder received

108. See supra part Il.A.2.
109. E.g., RMBCA §§ 2.02, 6.01, cmt. to § 6.21; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 151 (1992); Gelb, supra
note 5, at 3 n. 12.
110. Hackney, supra note 21, at 852-54, 857.
111. Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586, 588 (2d Cir. 1979); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray
Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d
Cir. 1960); Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Consumer's Co-Op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 216, 217 (Wis. 1988); FLETCHER, supra
note 4, § 41.30; PREsSER, supra note 4, § 1.05 at 1-45, § 2.05, at 2-19; Gelb, supra note 5, at 12; Hackney,
supra note 21, at 884, 885; Krendl, supra note 1, at 37-38; Should Shareholders be Personally Liablefor the
Torts of Their Corporations?,76 YALE LJ. 1190, 1193-94 (1967).
112. See supra part II.A.2.
113. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v, Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1989); DeWitt
Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687; Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.30; Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 361 n.317.
114. Hackney, supra note 21, at 865.
115. Id. at 887-88.
116. This rule is referred to as the "Deep Rock" doctrine and was applied in Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). See also Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 909, 910 (9th Cir. 1958) A
shareholder converted capital contributions into loans that the court subsequently subordinated to general
creditor claims. Id. Tanzi v. Fiberglass Swimming Pools, Inc., 414 A.2d 484, 488, 489 (R.I. 1980); FLETCHER,
supra note 4, § 41.55; Gelb, supra note 5, at 17; Hackney, supra note 21, at 859, 879-83.
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something from the company without giving adequate consideration." 7 In such
a situation, the rules of fraudulent conveyances oblige the shareholder to give
back to the company what was previously received. Although theories of
piercing the veil do not apply here, a court might consider the same factors
deemed to be necessary for piercing the corporate veil." 8
b. Definition
Undercapitalization in the context of piercing the veil refers to the net
assets 9 of a company that are available to satisfy creditors. 2° Formulas
used by the courts state that the capital of a corporation should not be
Additionally,
"inadequate," "grossly inadequate," "purely nominal."' 1
"shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered
capital adequate for its prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for
denying the separate entity privilege."' 2 2
The amount of capital deemed to be sufficient cannot be determined
precisely by shareholders. In order to avoid personal liability, they should make
an investment which gives their business a reasonable chance."2 In this
context, the magnitude of the business and the corporate undertaking, 24
including its prospective liabilities arising from contract and tort, must be
examined and anticipated by the shareholders. Howver, shareholders are not
guarantors of their business with respect to creditors. Therefore the capital does
not have to provide for the enterprise's likelihood of success.'5
To illustrate, the courts found undercapitalization in cases with capital of
$3,000 and annual gross revenues of $200,000;126 capital of $5,000 with
$150,000 in monthly revenues;' 27 and where the capital of $10,000 faced

117. HENN, supra note 4, § 147, at 354.
118. Consumer's Co-Op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Wis. 1988); Hackney, supra
note 21, at 854-60.
119. Net assets are distinguished from capital. For example, insurance benefitting third parties might also
be considered. See Gelb, supra note 5, at 12, 13.
120. Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 113; Hackney, supra note 21, at 890.
121. Baird Ward Printing Co. v. Great Recipes Publishing Assoc., 811 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1987). The
court found no undercapitalization where a corporation, acting as a general partner in a limited partnership, had
debts amounting to $700,000 and was initially capitalized with $50,000 and later with $250,000. Id.; Northern
Illinois Gas Co. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp., 502 F. Supp. 412, 417 (N.D. ll. E.D. 1980); Gelb, supra note
5, at 14.
122. Consumer's Co-Op, 419 N.W.2d at 216; BAuANTDNB supra note 4. § 129, at 303.
123. Hackney, supra note 21, at 892.
124. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
125. Hackney, supra note 21, at 897, 898.
126. Tanzi v. Fiberglass Swimming Pools, Inc., 414 A.2d 484, 490 (R.I. 1980). Additionally, the court
found complete control and for these reasons the court viewed loans the shareholder had given to his company
as equity contributions rather than bona fide loans. It also disallowed the shareholder to demand repayment
when his company went bankrupt. Id. at 488.
127. Automotriz del Golfo de California S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1957). The court
pierced the veil where the plaintiff had sold cars to the incorporated defendants. Despite the gross monthly
revenues, the defendants did not follow any corporate formalities, nor had they issued stock. ld.
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several millions of dollars in annual income.128 In Washington National Corp.
v. Thomas, 29 the court pierced the subsidiary's veil that had capital of
$150,000, but received $100,000 annually from the parent corporation in order
to pay off its debts. 130
Generally, companies are not required to look for experts' advice on how
much capital is adequate for their venture. However, in Sabine Towing &
Transportation Co. v. Merit Ventures, Inc.,131 the court disregarded the
principle of limited liability because the subsidiary had put up only $300,000 in
capital when the president, before hired, advised the parent to equip the
subsidiary with $800,000 in capital.132 Consequently, the court concluded that
the parent was bound by the expertise of its own president, who was the only
person having knowledge of the subsidiary's business of marine transportation.
c. Voluntary and Involuntary Creditors
In piercing the veil cases, courts often distinguish between tort and contract
creditors. Since contract creditors voluntarily entered into a contract with an
undercapitalized company they may not assert wrongdoing because they had the
chance to investigate the financial situation of the prospective debtor.' 33 This
argument is applicable to sophisticated creditors, such as banks or business
people, who are expected to know the practice in a particular industry. 13" Tort
creditors, without previous opportunities to inspect a debtor's background, will
more likely prevail when trying to pierce a company's veil. 35 The distinction
will become clear in the following cases.
In United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.,'36 the court reasoned that a tort
creditor had involuntarily assumed his position. Therefore, the creditor was not
required to show fraudulent practices on the part of137 the defendant parent
corporation, in addition to showing undercapitalization.
In Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc.,la the plaintiff entered into a land-option
contract with a subsidiary which had been founded by the parent for the sole
purpose of this transaction. When the subsidiary defaulted on contractual
payments, it only had capital of $1,000 and faced debts of $790,000 which were
incurred in this transaction. While the court found undercapitalization, it did not
128. United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 694 (5th Cir. 1985).
129. 570 P.2d 1268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
130. Id. at 1274. In addition, the court found that the subsidiary "deliberately was programmed to lose
large sums of money" and thus was dependent upon the parent. According to the court, injustice would result
if the parent was able to avoid liability. Id.
131. 575 F. Supp. 1442 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
132. Id. at 1447.
133. Gelb, supra note 5, at 10 n.43; Krendl, supra note 1, at 45, 46; Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 12,
13. Some courts expressly apply the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. Cf infra note 139.
134. Hackney, supra note 21, at 861-62; Gelb, supra note 5, at 13.
135. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.85, at 712; Hackney, supra note 21, at 901; Should Shareholders be
PersonallyLiable for the Torts of Their Corporations?,supra note 11, at 1196, 1198 (suggesting unlimited
liability of active shareholders in closely held corporations where the corporation is found to be undercapitalized).
136. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985).

137. Id. at 692. See also Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1984).
138. 377 So. 2d 465 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
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pierce the subsidiary's veil concluding that the plaintiff was a voluntary creditor
with the knowledge that subsidiaries often are incorporated for singular projects.
The plaintiff had not relied on the financial stability of the debtor, but rather on
the success of the intended construction project. Similar reasons were given in
Both
Bostwick-Braun Co. v. Szews 139 and Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman. 4
cases involved situations of undercapitalization where the veil was not lifted.
In Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v. Merit Ventures, Inc.,t 4t the
court pierced a subsidiary's veil where it had entered into a contract with the
creditor for the use of several of the creditor's ships. Although the subsidiary
had capital of $300,000, it was undercapitalized 42 compared to its business.
Consequently, it obtained bank loans for which the parent company pledged
securities. 113 Shortly before the subsidiary went bankrupt, the parent caused
the subsidiary to make payments to the bank, relieving the parent's debt to the
bank.'" The parent also obtained the $300,000" 5 it had loaned to the
subsidiary for capital. The court held that the parent dealt unjustly with the
subsidiary's creditors. Consequently the court granted the creditors payment
from the parent corporation.1 4
Again, in Washington National Corp. v. Thomas, 47 a contract creditor
pierced an undercapitalized subsidiary's veil. Because of other contracts with
corporations of the same group, the company never really had a chance to make
any profits. Therefore, liability was imposed on the parent that assumed the
fiction would work grave injustice
subsidiary's debts. Otherwise, '"the
148 corporate
upon the appellees [creditors]."
Courts may distinguish between various contract creditors holding that
certain contract creditors, being commercially inexperienced, such as workers,
employees, consumers, small-scale vendors, and utilities required to serve every
customer, lack sufficient bargaining power and should be treated as involuntary

139. 645 F. Supp. 221, 226 (W.D. Wis. 1986) The court held that the plaintiff knowingly entered into a
contract with his debtor corporation. Furthermore, the plaintiff had failed to exercise the opportunity to inspect
the corporation's financial sheets which he contractually had been entitled to, and at the same time, had
continued doing business with the debtor corporation. ld. It is noteworthy that the court applied the doctrines
of estoppel and waiver to the plaintiff's behavior and concluded that he thus was precluded from asserting the
corporation's undercapitalization. Id. at 226-27. This was affirmed in Consumer's Co-op where a creditor
extended credit to the debtor corporation despite his knowledge of the financial problems of the debtor
corporation and the extension was against its own policies. 419 N.W.2d 211, 212, 213, 216, 221 (Wis. 1988)
(quoting Bostwick-Braun Co., 645 F. Supp. at 226.
140. 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979). The court decided that piercing the veil would not accomplish justice
or fairness since the creditor entered into a contract with the debtor corporation with knowledge of all the
circumstances. The debtor corporation, which had no significant assets, and furthermore, had been formed for
the sole purpose to assume the buyer obligations in this contract for the sale of bowling alleys. Id. at 36.
141. 575 F. Supp. 1442 (E.D. Tex. 1983); see also supra part lI.B.l.b.
142. 575 F. Supp. at 1447.
143. Id. at 1445.
144. d. at 1448.
145. Id
146. Id. The court finally awarded damages amounting to more than $2.1 million. Id. at 1450.
147. 570 P.2d 1268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); see also supra part Ill.B.l.b.
148. Washington Nat'l Corp., 570 P.2d at 1274.
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tort creditors. 4 9 Additionally, thorough investigation into the financial stability
of a prospective debtor may be too expensive or time-consuming for a
prospective creditor. 5 ° The showing of fraudulent practices or wrongdoing,
in addition to undercapitalization, will be less important with respect to these
creditors.
d. Legal Consequences
Courts piercing the corporate veil hold liable only those shareholders who
actively engaged in their corporation's management.' 5' Thus, an application
of piercing the veil rules is usually not considered relevant with respect to
passive investors and publicly held corporations. Generally, disregard of the
entity occurs only in the context of closely held or one-shareholder companies
where the52shareholder conducts the business, rather than being merely a passive
investor. 1
Finally, although capitalization of an entity can be adequate at the beginning
of its existence, shareholders might fail to increase the capital and thus do not53
adapt to changed circumstances when the business has significantly grown.
A court may consider these cases of subsequent undercapitalization as equally
relevant. 154
2.

German law

a. General
Undercapitalization is the traditional fact pattern where piercing the veil is
discussed.1 5 5 There is general agreement that in certain circumstances involving undercapitalization, the limited liability of 5a6 corporation should be
disregarded and shareholders held personally liable.

149. Consumer's Co-Op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211,217 n.3 (Wis. 1988); BLUMBERG,
SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 77-78; FLETcHER, supra note 4, § 41.85, at 712; Blumberg, Limited
Liability, supra note 18, at 618; Gelb, supra note 5, at 13; Hackney, supra note 21, at 863-64.
150. Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 113.
151. Gelb, supra note 5, at 18-20; Hackney, supra note 21, at 876,877; Should Shareholders Be Personally
Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, supra note 111, at 1190, 1196-97; Thompson 1994, supra note
5, at 4, 10, 29.
152. Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 109, 110; Hackney, supra note 21, at 877; Thompson 1991, supra note
5, at 1039, 1047.
153. This notion is not accepted in all jurisdictions and was rejected by the court in Consumer's Co-op,
419 N.W.2d at 218-19. However, the court did not decide this question. It applied the doctrines of estoppel
and waiver and held that the contract creditor was precluded from bringing such an assertion because it had
extended credit to the corporation when the corporation was already indebted to the contract creditor. Id. at
221-22.
154. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th Cir. 1976);
Gelb, supra note 5, at 15, 18; Hackney, supra note 21, at 898, 899.
155. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no 27.
156. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 15; HAcHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.nos. 13, 48,
Anh. § 30, m.no. 2; LuTrrER, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 9; SCHMiDT, GEsE.LR. supra note 9, at 206, para. b,
208, para. c; SClOLZ, supra note 9, § 13, m.nos. 38-44; Nirk, supra note 64, at 454; Stimpel, supra note 15,
at 607; Hans Thuemmel, Piercing the Corporate Veil - Germany, 6 INT'L BUS. LAW. 282, 285 (1978).
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Contrary to American jurisdictions, German corporate law requires a
minimum stated capital of DM 100,000 for an Aktiengesellschaft and DM 50,000
57 There is no requirement to find a business with sufficient
for a GmbH.1
58
capital.1
There is general agreement among economists that the minimum capital
adequate for a particular business cannot be determined with sufficient certainty.
Accordingly, the legislature has not approved a flexible stated capital requirement
based on size and other factors of a business. 59 However, the provisions of
the AktG and the GmbH do not allow equity owners, having complied with the
statutory minimum requirements, to allocate all further financial risks to their
company's creditors."
b. Definition of Undercapitalization
As a consequence of the statutory minimum requirements, most commentators distinguish between nominal and material, or qualified, undercapitalization.1 61 Nominal undercapitalization refers to situations where the statutes'
minimum requirements are not met. Material undercapitalization describes
patterns in which the owners have invested insufficient amounts beyond these
requirements. In regard to material undercapitalization, a formula first used by
Ulmer is widely accepted. Under this formula, material undercapitalization is
present when the financial equipment of a corporation, including loans given by
to its business. This is measured
the shareholders, is insufficient when compared
1 62
by the nature and magnitude of the business.
In contrast, nominal undercapitalization refers to a violation of the minimum
capital requirements of the AktG and the GmbHG. 1 63 The typical situation,
however, is that owners have provided their company with loans, rather than
equity capital. Consequently, the loans in bankruptcy proceedings are viewed as
stated capital. A lender-shareholder's claim is subordinate to other creditors, and
the lender-shareholder has no right to demand payments on the loan."6 A
similar subordination rule exists with respect to an Aktiengesellschaft. However,

157. See GmbHG § 5, para. 2; AktG § 7.
158. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 10, 50; Ulrich Kahler, Die Haftung des
Gesellschaftersim Falle der Unterkapitalisierungeiner GmbH, 1985 BETRIEBs-BERATER 1429, 1433; Karsten
Schmidt, Die Eigenkapitalausstattungder Unternehmenals RechtspolitischesProblem, 1984 JZ 771,777, para.
1 [hereinafter Schmidt, Die Eigenkapitalausstattung].
159. HACHENBURG, supranote 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 6; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supranote 9, at 205; Kahler,
supra note 158, at 1430, para. 2(b); Schmidt, Die Eigenkapitalausstattung,supra note 158, at 777.
160. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 2.
161. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 9; SCHMmT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 206; Kahler,
supra note 158, at 1433; Schmidt, Die Eigenkapitalausstattung,supra note 158, at 777; Karsten Schmidt,
Jnsolvenzrisiko und GesellschaftsrechtlicheHaftung, 1985 JZ 301, 304 [hereinafter Schmidt, Insolvenzrisiko].
162. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 16, 18; Kahler, supra note 158, at 1430; SCHMIDT,
GESELLR, supra note 9, at 206.
163. Schmidt, Insolvenzrisiko, supra note 161, at 304, para. 1.
164. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 5, 6, 21; Schmidt, Die Eigenkapitalausstattung,
supra note 158, at 777. The applicable provisions are GmbHG §§ 32 (a)-(b). These sections state that a
member cannot claim repayment on a loan during bankruptcy proceedings or the member must return to the
GmbH any loan payment received during the year prior to the proceedings. Furthermore, GmbHG §§ 30-32
state that amounts necessary to preserve the stated capital shall not be returned to the members or the GmbH.
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because of different circumstances, 65 it is required that the shareholder have
an "entrepreneurial interest." This interest is shown by holding twenty-five
percent or more of the shares.'6 The justification for this threshold is that a
share of twenty-five percent gives the owner, under certain circumstances, a
decisive voice on important corporate issues that the shareholders' assembly
decides with a qualified majority. The size of a share implies that the
shareholder is interested in the company to an extent justifying the subordination
of a claim for repayment. Cases involving nominal undercapitalization are not
decided by theories of piercing the veil and are not pursued further here.
The following cases illustrate the standard for material undercapitalization.
Although some of the cases involve entity forms other than a GmbH, this does
not have an impact on the definition of material undercapitalization.
The OberlandesgerichtHamburg 67 rejected the liability of shareholders
for undercapitalization where two publishers had formed a GmbH for the purpose
of editing a new magazine.' 68 In addition to the statutory minimum stated
capital of DM 50,000, they provided the company with a loan of DM 700,000.
The amount of DM 750,000 was sufficient for publication of the initial three
editions of the magazine. However, the enterprise was unsuccessful and filed for
bankruptcy. The amount of capital was insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's
claim. Consequently, the plaintiff alleged that the shareholders were personally
liable. The court rejected the claim, reasoning that DM 750,000 was sufficient
to meet all the expenses incurred by the initial editions. Further, it could be
reasonably expected that the magazine's success or failure could be predictable
after three editions. Taking into account the shareholders' loans, the court found
no material undercapitalization. This decision was later cited with approval by
the Bundesgerichtshofin connection with another case.169
The Bundessozialgericht7 ° affirmed qualified undercapitalization in a
1
case 1 where the sole shareholder of a GmbH and Co.KG 172 applied for a
state benefit to enable creation of new jobs within the company. In his
application, the shareholder promised to invest more than DM 700,000 and hire
fifteen additional employees. Soon after he obtained the state support of DM
120,000, his company filed for bankruptcy. The court found that the company
conducted business of more than DM 1 million per year, but did not have capital

165. For example, the minimum capital (DM 100,000) is higher and there is no sole ownership. Compare
supra part Ill.A.2 with supra part lI.B.I.d. Moreover, the AktG provides for strict rules for the distribution
of corporate gains and the procurement and preservation of the stated capital. See SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra
note 9, at 738.
166. Case Comment, 1984 NJW 1893 [hereinafter 1984 NJW 1893]; HEINER DROKEM,
DIE HAFruN DER
MUTrrERGEsEi TCHAFr FOR SCHULDEN DER TOCHTERGESELLSCHAFr, EiNE UNTERSUCHUNG NACH DEurSCHEM
UND US-AMERKANISCHEM RECHT 31 (1990); SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 736-37.
167. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] signifies a trial court for selected criminal matters and a court of appeals.
See also supra note 61.
168. Case Comment, 1973 BETRiEBs-BERATER 1231.
169. Commentary, 1977 WERTPAPiER-MrrrELUNGEN 73, 75.
170. The federal Bundessozialgericht[BSG] is the highest court of appeals in civil welfare affairs.
171. Case Comment, 1984 NJW 2117.
172. See HANDELSGESErZBUCG [HGB] § 161. A Co.KG is a limited partnership with a GmbH as the
general partner. This limited partnership is called a Kommanditgesellschaft.
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sufficient to meet any obligations without additional revenues. Accordingly, the
court allowed the state to receive a repayment of the money because the
company did not use the money as stated in the application. For reasons of
material undercapitalization, the court held the shareholder personally responsible
for the obligations of the limited partnership.
In Architekten, the BundesgerichtshofP held there was material undercapitalization where two shareholders formed a GmbH and Co.KG.174 The
shareholders provided the company with capital of DM 30,000175 in order to
contract for the building of forty-one apartments at a fixed price of DM
2,050,000. Because of sharply increasing prices for land, it soon became clear
that the fixed price would be insufficient to cover all the expenses. Due to the
magnitude of the undertaking, it was equally evident that the investment capital
of DM 30,000 would not satisfy claims of all creditors. The court imposed
personal liability on the shareholders. However, the court technically did not
apply a doctrine of piercing the veil, but based its decision on a statutory
torts (BGB § 826)176 and concluded the shareholders
provision relating to civil
177
had acted in bad faith.
In Typenhaus,17' the same court refused to impose liability on a company's owner for his clearly undercapitalized GmbH. The court held that mere
undercapitalization alone was insufficient to pierce the veil. However, the eighth
panel of the Bundesgerichtshofrendered this decision. Normally this panel does
not decide cases involving corporate and commercial law. Consequently, the
second panel, which is generally competent in this area of law, criticized the
decision in a later case.' 79
The only case 181 in which the Bundesgerichtshofdisregarded an entity's
limited liability based on a theory of piercing the veil involved members of an
"eingetragener Verein."'' The members were held liable and were required
to pay the increase in rent owed by the association. However, this case is
inconclusive 82 because the situation was unusual in that it involved a Verein,
which, generally pursues no business and is not required to have a stated capital.
c.

Legal Consequences

i. Initial and Subsequent Undercapitalization
If the veil is pierced for reasons of undercapitalization, it is well settled that
all equity owners are liable. Liability extends to the creditor as opposed to the

173. Case Comment, 1979 NJW 2104 [hereinafter 1979 NJW 2104].
174. See supra note 172.
175. The statutory minimum then required stated capital of a GmbH to be DM 20,000 for a general partner
plus two times DM 5,000 in the owners' capacity as limited partners.
176. BGB § 826.
177. 1979 NJW 2104, supra note 173, at 2105.
178. 1977 NJW 1449, supra note 88, at 1450.
179. 1977 NJW 1683, supra note 88, at 1686; HACHENBURG, supra note 9,at Anh. § 30, m.no. 46.
180. Judgment of July 8, 1970, BGH, 54 BGHZ 222, 222.
181. See BGB §§ 21, 55. A "Verein" can be described as an association of its members who generally are
not personally liable for debts of the Verein. See SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 547, 563.
182. HAcHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 43.
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entity. Furthermore, liability is not limited to the extent of undercapitalization.8 3 As in American law, a differentiating standard is applied to cases of
subsequent undercapitalization where a company initially has sufficient capital
but fails to increase the stated capital after its business has significantly
enlarged.'
Here, only active owners participating in the company's management are held liable.
ii. Voluntary and Involuntary Creditors
Courts in Germany have not yet addressed the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary creditors as is done in most American jurisdictions.' 85
Thereore, a contract creditor may also pierce the corporate veil. However,
commentators recognize this problem, and the courts may follow them.
Therefore, a creditor, knowing the financial condition of the debtor company,
and voluntarily entering into a contract, may not receive a court's approval for
imposing shareholder liability, even if inadequate capitalization is clearly
present.8 6
d. Summary
The object of adequate capitalization is to ensure that the financial
equipment of a company is not subject merely to the discretion of the shareholders. The shareholders are not permitted to allocate all financial risks to the
company's creditors. 8 7 However, a creditor has a substantial burden to
overcome if it wishes to pierce a company's veil because of material undercapitalization.
The cases show, in the absence of specific statutory rules, that clear
stringent case law has not been developed by the Bundesgerichtshof and the
other highest federal courts in Germany. Therefore, undercapitalization may or
may not be sufficient for imposing shareholder liability. According to the dicta
of the Bundesgerichtsho 88 concerning the decision of the eighth panel in
Typenhaus,i8 9 the court may disregard an entity's limited liability solely
because of material undercapitalization. If the stated capital, although sufficient
to meet the statutory minimum, factually does not provide security for the
prospective creditors, the underlying purpose of the statutes regarding the
procurement and preservation of equity capital would not be fulfilled. 19°

183. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 52(a), 60, 62; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9,
at 208, para. bb (the author disagrees and argues for a company's claim against the owners); Nirk, supra note
64, at 462.
184. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 22, 60; LurTER, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 9;
Stimpel, supra note 15, at 609, 612. See supra part HI.B.I.c (discussing the American law in this context).
185. See supra parts II.B.l.b-c.
186. DROKE, supra note 166, at 51-59; HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.no. 65; LUTrER, supra
note 10, § 13, m.no. 9; Kahler, supra note 158, at 1433.
187. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1959, BGH, 31 BGHZ 258, 268; DROKE, supra note 166, at 33.
188. 1977 NJW 1683, supra note 88, at 1686, para. b.
189. 1977 NJW 1449, supra note 88, at 1450.
190. HACHENBIRG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 30, m.nos. 11, 52. See supra note 164 (providing a description
of these provisions).
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C.

Commingling of Assets and Disregardof CorporateFormalities
1. American Law
Although there is no exact distinction between commingling of assets and

disregard of corporate formalities,"9 ' the cases prove that two different fact

patterns are involved. First, there are situations where assets can no longer be
clearly assigned to either the shareholders or their company. These situations are
referred to as commingling of assets. Second, there are situations where the
separate identity of equity owners and their company is not evident. For the
purpose of this paper these situations are referred to as disregard of corporate
formalities.
a.

Commingling of Assets
i.

Definition
Generally, singular transfers of assets or goods between owners and their
corporation do not justify piercing the veil, even if the transfer is below market
price or if no compensation is received by the corporation. What is required is
a commingling of the corporate books, records, and accounts, creating the
impression of a unity of a shareholder and his entity."
If the impression is given that certain items belong to an entity which in
fact belong to the shareholder, the shareholder is precluded from asserting
ownership in bankruptcy proceedings and the assets are treated as corporate
property.'93 Equally, a shareholder receiving corporate assets, without giving
adequate consideration to the corporation is not subject to piercing the veil. She
or he must, however, return the goods back to the corporation under the rules of
fraudulent conveyance law, if the corporation goes bankrupt. t "' The following
cases provide some illustrations.
In Penick v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., the court refused to pierce a subsidiary's veil where an employee, claiming wrongful termination of an employment
contract, also sued the parent corporation. The court argued that transactions
between the two companies were at arm's length; both maintained separate
96
financial records and there was no commingling or diversion of assets.
Similarly, in Amsted Industries, Inc. v. Pollak Industries, Inc.,197 the court
refused to pierce the veil. Here, two closely held corporations were dominated
by the same individual shareholder, had the same address, telephone number,

191. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.30, at 663.
192. Id. § 41.50, at 700.
193. In re Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1986). A bankruptcy trustee brought suit against shareholders of
a corporation, which owned an amusement park constructed on land personally belonging to the shareholders.
The court allowed the plaintiffs claim and treated the land as corporate property because the shareholders, in

a disclosure statement, had listed the land as corporate property. Id. at 76.
194. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1265 (10th Cir. 1989);
BALLANTINE, supra note 4, § 131, at 304; BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, § 20.04., at 506-07.
195. 579 F. Supp. 160 (D.C. 1984).

196. Id. at 166.
197. 382 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
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office, and managing employees. However, the books, accounts, etc. of both
corporations were clearly distinguishable from each other.
ii. Detriments to the creditor
Under the theories applied by most courts, a creditor plaintiff must also
show the element of fraud or injustice."' The mere commingling of assets is
insufficient for piercing the corporate veil.'"
In Vuitch v. Furr,2° the court found that the affairs of a clinic and a
hospital, separately incorporated, but owned by the same doctor, had been
confused. Therefore, the court used the alter ego doctrine's2"' first prong of
unity of interest. 2" The court further required the plaintiff, who had suffered
injuries during her treatment at the clinic, to show some unfairness or injustice
perpetrated by the use of the corporate form. The court found certain statutory
violations as to overnight policies to be sufficient in this regard.20 3 The court
held that injustice and unfairness could also be shown by factors other than
undercapitalization or insolvency.2°4
In In re Palmer Trading, Inc.,20 a bankruptcy trustee wanted to impose
liability on a corporation affiliated with the debtor corporation to claim a tax
refund the former corporation had obtained. The trustee was unsuccessful
because the court found that the debtor corporation had benefitted from the
transactions with the affiliated corporation. 2°6 The court also rejected the
assumption that the presence of commingling of assets, per se, would be
disadvantageous to a corporate creditor. 2°7
In most cases, courts neglect the element of causation as the third prong of
the instrumentality rule.20" Causation requires that the harm to the creditor be
the result of the transactions by the defendant owners. 209 In contrast, the court
in In re Palmer Trading, Inc. seems to have applied a stricter theory by
underlining the importance of this factor.2 0 Howver, the creditor sought to
impose liability on an affiliated company rather than on the parent,21 ' a
situation which lacks the vertical chain of command between a parent and a
subsidiary. In such a context, it is more likely that commingling of assets is not
disadvantageous to a creditor's debtor corporation because no domination by the
198. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text. Most courts use the doctrines of alter ego or
instrumentality to pierce the corporate veil.
199. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1989).
200. 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984).
201. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
202. Vuitch, 482 A.2d at 817.
203. Id. at 819. The clinic was licensed as an ambulatory center and kept patients overnight.
204. Id at 819.
205. 695 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1983).
206. Id. at 1016-17.
207. Id. at 1017.
208. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
210. In re Palmer Trading, Inc., 695 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1983).
211. Two subsidiaries can be regarded as standing next to each other on the same level. It can be said that
piercing the veil, in such a context, is applied horizontally. In contrast, if liability of a parent entity is sought,
the corporate veil is pierced vertically.
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parent is involved. Typically however, where a creditor claims the dominating
shareholder's liability, it is clearer that the transactions were to the debtor
entity's disadvantage. Therefore, in the present case, the court had reasons for
strictly applying the element of causation. However, the court had already
rejected the plaintiff's claim because he could not show the element of fraud.
iii. Voluntary and Involuntary Creditors
Courts normally do not differentiate between the various kinds of creditors.
The corporation will be liable to contract and tort creditors alike."' Here even
contract creditors are not able to distinguish between corporate and shareholder's
assets.2 13
iv. Horizontal and Vertical Liability
A parent corporation will not be liable under a theory of piercing the veil
if there is a clear line separating it from its subsidiaries.2" 4 However, several
subsidiaries will be subject to mutual liability if their assets are indistinguishable
from each other.2 1 ' Limited liability will be disregarded only to the extent a
creditor could reasonably have the false impression of the ownership of the
entity. Accordingly, limited liability can be disregarded horizontally or
vertically, depending on whether liability of another subsidiary or the parent
company is sought.216
b.

Disregard of Corporate Formalities

i. Fact Patterns
Shareholder liability may also be imposed where a creditor was misled as
to the identity of the debtor corporation 2" and thus had reason to believe that
it dealt with one company, rather than with several or with an entirely different
company.2"' For example, two corporations might not be distinguishable if
they have similar names, though this factor alone is often insufficient.2 1 9
In Morgan Bros., Inc. v. Haskell Corp.,22 the court pierced the veil. The
plaintiff, in a third-party complaint, stated that he ordered goods from "Hanson's
Pipe and Supply Company of Arizona" and was answered by "Hanson, Inc."
when he claimed for warranties. Both companies had the same address and
management people. The court found that "Hanson, Inc." was the parent

212. BLUMBERG, SuBsTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, §§ 19.09.2, 19.09.3.
213. Id. § 20.04.
214. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Pollak Indus., Inc., 382 N.E. 2d 393, 397 (IL. App. Ct. 1978).
215. Hackney, supra note 21, at 878.
216. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
217. McFerren v. Universal Coatings, Inc., 430 So. 2d 350, 352 (La. 1983). In this case, the plaintiff
brought suit on a contract for the installation of an ice skating surface against the debtor corporation and
another corporation, where the other corporation was in the same business and not clearly separated by their
common president during the negotiations. Id.
218. Id. at 353 (citing A-A-A Foundations, Inc. v. Elite Homes, Inc., 217 So. 2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1969)).
219. Divco-Wayne Sales Financial Corp. v. Martin Vehicle Sales, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 287,289,290 (. App.
Ct. 1963) (quoting Sexton & Co. v. Library Plaza Hotel Corp., 270 IlI.App. 107, 110 (Il. App. Ct. 1933)).
220. 604 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
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corporation of the company with which the plaintiff had contracted. Because of
the similar appearance of parent and subsidiary corporation, the court granted the
plaintiff's claim against the parent.22'
A plaintiff was successful in My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms,
Inc.222 The plaintiff delivered baking goods to several retail dairy stores where
he had installed his own racks. The case involved the conversion of these racks.
The stores were all incorporated and held by the same shareholder family, which
owned a milk plant that sold its products in the same stores. The family was
represented in all business affairs by the same member that had negotiated with
the plaintiff.223 In addition to the local stores, the court imposed liability on
the milk company although it had no ownership interest in the stores. Since the
stores and the milk company operated under the same name, the court held that
the businesses were indistinguishable from each other.22
ii. Extent of Liability
Only those creditors affected by the misperception of a debtor corporation's
appearance and identity are allowed to pierce the veil. Without relying on these
circumstances, tort creditors will not prevail in these cases.
For example, in Wiedemann v. Cunard Line, Ltd.,225 a tort creditor
suffered injuries at a beach while on vacation and brought a claim against the
cruise company whose ship took him to the holiday location. The plaintiff
creditor alleged that the cruise company's advertisements had given rise to the
perception that it was also responsible for the maintenance of the hotel and beach
which were actually owned by another corporation. The court held that,
although one might have been misled by the defendant's advertisements, this did
not have any relation to the damages the plaintiff involuntarily incurred. 226 For
the same reason, the fact that the defendant cruise company and the company
owning the hotel and the beach had the same parent corporation was irrelevant
and did not make the defendant liable for the tortious acts of the other
subsidiary.
Courts do not clearly distinguish between fact patterns involving commingling of assets and disregarding corporate formalities. In both situations, a
creditor is misled by false impressions relating to the entity. Thus, a court will
only allow a horizontal application of piercing the veil if corporate formalities
were disregarded among the subsidiaries without the parent's involvement.
2. German Law
Commentators generally distinguish between Vermoegensvermischung and
Sphaerenvermischung. Vermoegensvermischung is where corporate and

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1298.
233 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1968).
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 752, 753.
380 N.E.2d 932 (111.App. Ct. 1978).
Id. at 938, 939.
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individual assets are indistinguishable.
227
identity of the company is unclear.
a.

Sphaerenvermischung is where the

Commingling of Assets - Vermoegensvermischung

i. Definition
The Bundesgerichtshof stated in an early case that an entity's limited
liability might be disregarded because personal and corporate assets or spheres
were commingled. 228 However, this was only in dictum. In the case at bar,
the court denied the shareholder's liability.
Previously, the OberlandesgerichtKarlsruhe in another case, disregarded
a corporation's limited liability because its sole shareholder stated personal
assets, consisting of a personal loan and several houses as belonging to the
GmbH, which was actually bankrupt. 229 The court concluded that the shareholder had not separated the two different spheres and, therefore, could not assert
his personal ownership. The court regarded the individual and the company as
one entity.
The Bundesgerichtshof, in a more recent case, held that a shareholder's
liability requires that assets cannot be clearly assigned to either the company or
its shareholders. 2 0 Therefore, it is necessary that the company's books and
records are so unclear that a distinction is impossible.
Consequently, singular asset transfers between a company and its
shareholders are insufficient to justify shareholder liability.23 ' However, assets
which cannot be clearly assigned to either a shareholder or the company may be
subject to extended liability and a shareholder may be precluded from asserting
ownership. 32 Equally, piercing the veil will not occur where a shareholder
receives assets that belong to the company. In such a situation, however, the
company may have a claim against the shareholder for returning the items to the
company if the original transfer rendered the company's stated capital inadequate
to meet its obligations.233
Imposition of shareholder liability, on the other hand, requires that the
shareholder's and the company's ownership are indistinguishable. A court will

227. BAUMBACH, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 15; LuTTER, supra note 10, § 13, m.nos. 11, 12; ROWEDDER,
supra note 15, § 13, m.no. 23; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 201-03; Nirk, supra note 64, at 453;
Karsten Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgriffwegen Sphiirenvermischungund zur Haftungsverfassungim GmbHKonzern, 1985 BETRIEBS-BERATER 2074, 2075-76 [hereinafter Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgrifl].
228. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1956, BGH, 22 BGHZ 226.
229. 1943 DR 811.
230. Case Commentary, 1985 NJW 740 [hereinafter 1985 NJW 740). This was confirmed by the same
court. Commentary, 1994 ZEITSCHRFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrRECHT [ZIP] 867, 867-68. However, personal liability
of the GmbH's member was denied because he did not control the entity. See also Schmidt, Zur
Durchgriffsfestigkeit,supra note 91.
231.

BAUMBACH, supra note 10,

§

13, m.no. 15.

232. SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 201-02; Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgriff,supra note 227, at
2075.
233. See GmbHG §§ 30-31, para. 1; 1985 NJW 740, supra note 230; Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgriff,
supranote 227, at 2076; HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.no. 50; Stimpel, supra note 15, at 615.
This rule is also applicable to an Aktiengesellschaft unless the transfer was a regular distribution of corporate
profits; Cf. AktG § 58, para. 4.
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pierce the corporate veil only if the transfers between a shareholder and the
company cannot be traced by viewing the books and records. 231 This was
affirmed by the Bundesgerichtshofin a decision235 which has become famous
with respect to Konzernrecht, the law of affiliated companies.2 36 Therefore, the
decision of the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe mentioned above might have a
narrower holding today; according to which, the creditor would only be able to
seek satisfaction with respect to the assets previously listed in the company's
financial sheets. Generally, shareholder liability will depend upon the extent that
the assets have been commingled, unless the company's books and records make
a distinction impossible which will justify piercing the veil.
ii. Voluntary and Involuntary Creditors
German courts to date have not made a distinction between tort and contract
creditors. Therefore, individual liability extends to all creditors whether or not
they relied on the corporate appearance regarding its assets. A denial of personal
liability with respect to a tort creditor would unjustly enrich a shareholder.
iii. Extent of Liability
German courts have neither focused on whether the corporate veil should
only be lifted for the imposition of vertical shareholder liability nor whether it
could be disregarded in a situation involving several subsidiaries. 237 However,
commentators23 have addressed the distinction between lifting the corporate
veil vertically or horizontally. Following the American approach, they suggest
horizontal liability if the assets of subsidiaries were commingled. Consequently,
a creditor should be allowed to sue those subsidiary companies, whose assets
were not kept separate from the indebted company. The underlying shareholders
should not be liable in such a situation. Moreover, a creditor should not be
permitted to claim liability against other affiliated entities or owners if the debtor
company benefitted from transfers between the entities.
Contrary to the preceding, a parent company will be liable for its
subsidiary's debts if a creditor was unable to distinguish clearly between the
extent of their ownership. In this situation, the corporate veil would be lifted
vertically.

234. Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgriff,supra note 227, at 2076; Stimpel, supra note 15, at 606; LUtrrER,
supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 11; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 13, m.no. 28.
235. Judgment of Sept. 16, 1986, BGH, 95 BGHZ 330, 333 (holding the owner of several GmbHs
personally liable).
236. See infra notes 483-554 and accompanying text.
237. In Autokran, the Bundesgerichtshofconcluded the defendant, as sole member of several affiliated
GmbHs, was not liable for reasons of commingling personal and companies' assets. The court did not inquire
whether the 7 GmbHs were liable for each others' debts. 95 BGHZ 33. Cf infra note 510.
238. E.g., HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.no. 51; Stimpel, supra note 15, at 607.
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b.

Disregard of Corporate Formalities - Sphaerenvermischung

i. Definition
A court might also pierce a company's veil where the shareholder and
corporation disregard corporate formalities, leading a creditor to misperceive the
corporation's identity. 3 9 This may be the case where a parent and its subsidiary use similar names, staff, rooms, or addresses.2 ° It is unclear that a
creditor is factually dealing with two or several entities. Likewise there is no
clear line as to what a corporation and its shareholder own in situations of
commingling of assets. 4
The Oberlandesgericht Nuernberg heard a case where a negotiable
instrument bore both the signature of a sole proprietor and the GmbH's
stamp.242 The signor, who was also the sole member of the GmbH, was not
authorized to sign the instrument.24 3 However, he operated the sole proprietorship under a quite similar name in the same office. When the creditor having
a claim against the GmbH, seized the instrument to satisfy the claim. The signor
alleged personal ownership of the instrument, thus denying ownership of the
GmbH. The court concluded that even if the signor had personally issued the
instrument, and no obligation of the debtor GmbH existed, he nonetheless could
not assert his individual ownership because he made no distinction between the
conduct of his company and his personal business.
Considering the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof,2" the Oberlandesgericht Nuernberg's holding does not seem to be consistent. The Bundesgerichtshof held that a corporation and its shareholders might be identified with
each other where they did not follow the required formalities. It has been argued
however, that the court dogmatically based its holding on a theory of misrepresentation."' Consequently, a creditor should not be able to pierce the corporate veil if he did not rely on the company's appearance or similar circumstances.
Therefore, the reasoning of the OberlandesgerichtNuernberg should be rejected
in that case because the GmbH's creditor had only dealt with the GmbH. It had
no knowledge of the facts that the court deemed to be necessary to justify
246
piercing the veil and, accordingly, did not rely on any misrepresentation.
Nonetheless, the court correctly concluded that the instrument was issued by the

239. Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgrf,supra note 227, at 2075; Nirk, supra note 64, at 453; LurJrER,
supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 12.
240. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 202, 203.
241. See infra notes 257-69 and accompanying text.
242.

Commentary, 1955 wERTPAPIER-MrrrELUNGEN 1566.

243. GmbHG § 37 states that the manager is subject to the owner's decision. In contrast to this rule, the
member here was obviously not authorized to manage and represent the GmbH. The relationship between
ownership and management is described in the context of Konzemrecht.
244. Judgment of Sept. 16, 1986, BGH, 95 BGHZ 330; 1985 NJW 740, supra note 230; see infra notes
259-61 and accompanying text.
245. See DROKE, supra note 166, at 82-83 (referring to the court's statement at the end of its decision);
cf 1985 NJW 740, supra note 230, at 741.
246. See DROKE, supra note 166, at 82.
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company, the debtor GmbH. Accordingly, the GmbH's sole member had no
individual rights as to the instrument and the creditor could seize it.
ii. Extent of Liability
If the dogmatic justification is based on a theory of misrepresentation, it
follows that only a voluntary creditor should be able to pierce the veil. A tort
creditor, not relying on perceptions as to the spheres of an entity and its owner,
should not prevail in holding the owner personally liable.247 Liability should
follow the extent to which there have been elements of misrepresentation and
misleading of creditors.24 a Thus, a company's sibling company may be liable
for the former's debts if there was no clear distinction as to their particular
spheres. If the parent corporation is clearly distinguishable from the subsidiaries,
it will not be liable to their creditors and there will be only a horizontal
expansion of liability. Howver, these questions have not been addressed by the
courts.
D. Summary
The approaches taken by American and German law, with respect to the
issue of shareholder liability, are rather similar. First, in both jurisdictions, the
courts developed the rules of piercing the veil and Durchgriffshaftung,referring
to the topic of shareholder liability for obligations of an entity, without statutory
provisions. Second, the fact patterns of domination, undercapitalization, and
commingling of personal and corporate assets, and disregard of corporate
formalities dominate this context. Third, neither system regards the presence of
only one of these patterns as sufficient in order to disregard the legal entity.
However, considering the dicta mentioned by the Bundesgerichtshof in
Typenhaus, German courts may pierce the veil where the entity is inadequately
capitalized, although no case has been decided solely for this reason.249 Both
legal systems agree that domination of an entity by itself does not justify
disregarding the principle of limited liability. Accordingly, one-owner entities
are permissible and are often found in both countries.
With respect to the factor of undercapitalization, there is a general
difference between the jurisdictions. German law provides rules for the
procurement and preservation of a stated minimum capital." 5 In contrast
American statutes require the owners to put up only small amounts. Consequently, owners under German law may be sued more often for returning stated capital
or may have their claims for repayments of loans given to the entity instead of
capital subordinated. 5 An American court will resort to piercing the veil
rules in a similar context.

247. Id. at 86.
248.

Id.

249. The second panel of the court criticized the eigth panel which previously held that inadequate
capitalization is not sufficient. See supra notes 177, 178.
250. The minimum requirements are DM 100,000 for an Aktiengesellschaft (AktG § 7) and DM 50,000
for a GmbH (GmbHG § 5, par. 1). See supra note 157.
251. In American law this concept is referred to as the "Deep Rock" doctrine, see supra note 116. The
German law is found in GmbHG §§ 30-32. See supra note 164.
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The justification for the statutory lack of capital minimum requirements
given by American commentators is that the problem of an adequate capitalization is one beyond the statutes. Although this is certainly true252 as the German
cases indicate it has to be conceded at the same time that capital requirements
do provide shelter for corporate creditors. Especially, creditors are secured under
the rules of the AktG which provide very strict and precise requirements as to
the distribution of corporate gains and the procurement and preservation of the
stated capital. 2 3
It should be recalled that personal shareholder liability in both jurisdictions
is an issue practically confined to non-public entities, i.e., mostly closely held
corporations in the U.S. and GmbHs in Germany. Neither legal system knows
of cases where the veil of a publicly held corporation or an Aktiengesellschaft
has been disregarded.
Beyond the differences related to a stated minimum capital the rules are
quite similar. The factor of an inadequate capitalization for purposes of
disregarding a corporate entity will be considered by a court if the capital
invested clearly does not accord with the magnitude of the business and its
undertaking.
Finally, both legal systems recognize situations involving commingling of
assets and disregarding corporate formalities as significant when deciding on the
issue of piercing the veil. German law, however, draws a clearer distinction
between these different patterns.
Although the main patterns in which the topic of piercing the veil arises are
quite similar, the American legal system also focuses on issues the German law
does not consider. For example, American courts often concentrate on the
question whether or not a creditor voluntarily assumed his position. Furthermore,
the relevant factors such as domination or undercapitalization might be weighed
differently depending on a creditor's status and, in general, a contract creditor
has to overcome more obstacles for stating a cause of action. Similarly, this is
true with respect to the issue of lifting the veil horizontally or vertically which
might become relevant in cases of commingling assets or disregarding
formalities. German courts have yet to address these issues.
One relevant reason is that American courts have addressed the topic of
shareholder liability in numerous cases. This may be illustrated by Professor
Thompson's article as of 1991 cited several times in this paper.2' Pessor
Thompson conducted a survey on the topic of piercing the veil which involved
some 1,600 cases dealing with this issue.255 Professor Blumberg in his treatise
on the law of corporate groups even listed some 5,500 cases the most of which
are related to this issue.256

252. German commentators agree that it is impossible to determine the exact amount of stated capital that
is sufficient in this respect. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
253. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 736, 737. The rules are embodied in AktG §§ 150-76, 179-81.
The description of which cannot be achieved within the scope of this paper.
254. Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at I passim.
255. Thompson 1991, supra note 5, at 1044.
256. Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 328 n.182.
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In contrast, German courts have addressed the topic of piercing the veil only
very rarely. One reason certainly can be tied to the differences of the judicial
systems in both countries. Whereas the United States has its many state and
federal jurisdictions, the German system has only one jurisdiction which consists
of courts on various levels in the states and the federal Bundesgerichtshof as the
final authority. The Bundesgerichtshofmay have issued about 50 decisions which
are related to this topic.2 7 These numbers reveal another main difference of the
two legal systems.
With respect to features such as legal certainty, the prediction of the courts'
decisions and their consistency, conclusive statements regarding a particular case
can be made in neither country. Much like the United States, the presence of
multiple jurisdictions, each apply different standards resulting in varying
precedents, must be taken into account. Despite the pertaining differences it
equally appears that German courts not yet have achieved more stringent rules
determining the question of piercing the veil. Another reason presumably is that
piercing the veil and Durchgriffshaftung are based on case law which inherently
involves less legal certainty than statutory provisions providing definitions and
rules. This analysis will be confirmed when describing the German rules referred
to as Konzernrecht as a main part of the following chapter." That area of law
is based on code provisions which provide rather clear prerequisites as to their
application and the legal consequences.
IV. PIERCING THE VEIL - PARENT-SUBSIDIARY SITUATIONS
A.

Introduction
Shareholder liability may also be at stake where a company is owned by
one or several other companies that form a group of affiliated entities. The
approaches undertaken by the American and the German laws are very different.
American courts extend the application of the common law rules of piercing the
veil. German courts are constrained by statutory provisions embodied in the
AktG. 259 These provisions are directly applicable to an Aktiengesellschaft (a
corporation) dominated by other entities. While the AktG does not apply
expressly to GmbHs, courts and commentators have extended the statute's
application by analogy to a GmbH. 260
Under AktG sections 302, 303, and 317, the controlling entity has to assume
the subsidiary's liabilities and losses. Accordingly, these sections provide the
general presumption that control by a parent company pursuing further business
interests outside its subsidiary is disadvantageous and sufficient to justify the
controlling entity's duty.261 The parent company's liability exists regardless
of whether the obligation of the dominated company arose out of contract or tort

257. See generally, SCHMiDT, GESF.1R, supra note 9, at 187; SCHOLZ,supra note 9, § 13, m.nos. 16, 17.
258. Infra part IV.CA.
259. The code provisions referred to in this introduction are described in more detail in the relevant context.
See infra part IV.C.4.a-b.
260. Maximillian Schiessl, The Liability of Corporations and Shareholdersfor the Capitalization and
Obligations of Subsidiaries under German Law, 7 J.INT'L L.Bus. 480, 496 (1986).
261. Peter Ulmer, Glidubigerschutzim "qualifizierten"faktischenGmbH-Konzern, 1986 NJW 1579, 1580.
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or whether a creditor knew of the dominant relationship affecting the debtor
company.
B. American Law
1. General
Domination of a corporation in the context of parent and subsidiary
companies, impacting on the latter's creditors, may become relevant in two
situations. First, a parent's domination and control over a subsidiary may entitle
the latter's creditors to pierce its veil. Obviously, creditors derive a direct
benefit in such a context.
Second, a parent company may violate fiduciary duties owed to the
subsidiary causing an action for damages. There is an obvious benefit to the
subsidiary's minority shareholders as residual corporate beneficiaries because
their entity's assets are increased. Although piercing the veil is not involved
because the claim for a violation of fiduciary duties is not based upon obligations
incurred by the subsidiary, these situations also affect creditors of the subsidiary.
Therefore, situations involving a claim against the parent for a violation of
fiduciary duties are addressed before turning the focus to the subject of piercing
the veil in the context of parent-subsidiary relations.
2. Violations of Duties Owed to a Subsidiary
The dogmatic justification for a parent corporation's and, in general, a
majority shareholder's liability to the subsidiary is the violation of fiduciary
duties. These include the duties of care and, in the context of affiliated entities,
that of loyalty. It is recognized that a majority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty
to the corporation and also to minority shareholders when exercising control.262
Equally, a parent company that pursues other business interests outside the
dominated corporation within a group of affiliated entities owes these fiduciary
duties. 263 Accordingly, the rules applicable to the majority-minority relationship are the same regardless of whether the corporation is independent or
dominated by another company having additional business goals.26 Alterna265
tively, if there is no minority shareholder, fiduciary duties do not exist.
A parent's liability to a subsidiary corporation may arise in two situations.
In the first group, only the rights of the minority, but not the rights of the
subsidiary, are violated. For example, a majority shareholder may deprive the

262. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88, 492 (1919); Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario,
S.A. v. Gibbs, 709 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
263. In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 517 (3d Cit. 1983); Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective

Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 173 F.2d 416, 420-23 (D.C. 1949); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,
509 A.2d 584, 595 (Del. 1986); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del. 1977); Sinclair Oil Corp.

v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Ch. 1971); Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261, 264 (Del.
1982). See infra note 266 (describing Gabelli v. Liggett); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).

264. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Mayflower, 173 F.2d at 423; J. Bautz Bonarno, The
Protection of Minority Shareholdersin a Konzern under German and United States Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J.
151, 165 (1977).
265. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988).
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minority of its rights to dividends2" or may acquire the minority's shares at
too low a price.267 The parent will be held liable to the minority shareholders
but not to the subsidiary. As company creditors are not affected, these patterns
are of no further interest here.
Second, a parent may violate its duties toward the subsidiary causing
indirect damage to the minority shareholders whose shares decrease in value. In
this case, the subsidiary is entitled to a claim. However, the shareholders may
bring a derivative suit if the subsidiary itself does not act.268 The subsidiary's
creditors benefit in a derivative suit because the assets of the debtor corporation
are increased.269
The following fact patterns have evolved where a parent corporation might
violate fiduciary duties to the subsidiary:
"the parent seizes a business opportunity of the subsidiary;27 1
271
" the overpriced transfers from the parent to the subsidiary;
of benefits received by a consolidated tax return
"the subsidiary's exclusion
272
entities;
two
of the
* the withdrawal of capital from the subsidiary by extensive dividends.273
Courts have applied several fairness tests to evaluate whether fiduciary
duties were violated. They include: the arm's length test, the lack-of-fraud test,
the business judgment rule, and the intrinsic fairness test. These tests are briefly
described in the following paragraphs.
The arm's length test,2 74 which places the burden of proof on the parent,
may be applied to transactions between corporations and their directors or
officers, and also between parent and subsidiary. The purpose is to determine
whether performance and counter-performance are of similar value. In general,
a price paid by the parent for goods or services received by the subsidiary is
deemed to be fair if it would have been the same in the case of an independent
corporation dealing with the parent.27' A court's finding will be relatively easy

266. Gabelli & Co., 444 A.2d at 263. The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, alleged a breach of fiduciary
duties by the directors and failure of declaring dividends, which occurred when the company was to merge into
another corporation. Therefore, the plaintiff also asserted a breach of fiduciary duties by the prospective parent,
a majority shareholder, for causing the board of directors not to declare a dividend. Id. Plaintiff failed to state
a cause of action because it did not oppose the merger or the merger price. Id.
267. Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1982); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc.,
249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968).
268. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the complaining party must
describe with particularity that they made demands on the board of directors, unless the party can show the
demands would be futile); see also Collie v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727, 731-32 (Colo. 1988).
269. Massachusetts v. Davis, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942).
270. Collie, 762 P.2d at 730-31; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (holding that
the plaintiff, as minority shareholder of a subsidiary, could not show that the opportunity exercised by the
parent had come to the subsidiary).
271. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
272. Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. 1967).
273. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720-21.
274. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 166-69; Michael B. Goldberg, Note, The FiduciaryDuty of Parent to
Subsidiary Corporation,57 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1226-27 (1971).
275. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 764 (6th Cir.
1949); Gottesman, 279 F. Supp. at 385 (S.D.N.Y.) (giving further references).
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if it can resort to comparable market prices. For example, where the parent
causes the subsidiary to provide the former with a loan, the parent would be
obliged to pay interest at the applicable banks' prime rate or the effective rate,
if higher.276 However, in many cases, there will be no applicable market
price.277 Consequently, the courts have determined this test to be inapplicable
to parent-subsidiary transactions.27
In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,279 a minority shareholder of
General Motors asserted that supply parts purchased from DuPont were
overpriced. At the time, DuPont held twenty-three percent of the outstanding
stock of General Motors and controlled six out of thirty-one, and later five out
of thirty-four of the directorates." ° The court found that by virtue of its stock,
DuPont had the power to control General Motors. 28 ' However, DuPont had
not always sold parts to General Motors, and the latter's competitors purchased
those parts instead. Also, General Motors purchased other parts from DuPont's
competitors.282 The court concluded that the parties dealt at arm's length, 2 3
under market conditions, and that DuPont had not exercised its power to
control 2' and had not breached any fiduciary duties. 85
Under the lack-of-fraud test, a majority shareholder's conduct is deemed to
be fair to the subsidiary and its minority shareholders in the absence of
fraud.286 A plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in bad faith to gain
an advantage. The test is disadvantageous for a plaintiff because of the burden
of proof required. Furthermore, it can be argued that bad faith is not an accurate
requirement in these situations because mere control is often sufficient to cause
damages to the subsidiary.287 The test applies little judicial scrutiny to the
parent's conduct and thus a plaintiff is likely to fail.288 Under the lack of fraud
test, some courts have developed a theory of constructive fraud, 289 which
disregards the element of bad faith if the parent corporation acted in a situation

276. Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 347, 355-56 (N.Y.C. 1972).
277. Goldberg, supra note 274, at 1227.
278. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970). 'It is, of course, obvious that it is
impossible, as between parent and subsidiary, to approximate what would have been agreed upon at arm's
length." Id. Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967).
279. 279 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
280. Id. at 364-67.
281. Id. at 368.
282. Id. at 370, 375.
283. Id. at 385.
284. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
285. Id. at 384.
286. Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 765-66 (6th Cir. 1949).
287. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 170; Goldberg, supra note 274, at 1229.
288. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 170; Goldberg, supra note 274, at 1229.
289. Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 197 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1952). In this case, a parent
corporation, which had been dominated by its subsidiary, claimed compensation for benefits the subsidiary had
received under a consolidated tax return filed by the parent. Id. at 998, 1001. The court rejected the claim
and found that the governing agreement was fair because the subsidiary, which in the tax return had used the
parent's losses to offset against its own taxable income, had not gained anything at the subsidiary's expense.
The subsidiary had failed to provide for a compensation clause in the agreement. Id. at 1002-04. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (206 F.2d 495) denying a rehearing for the same reasons and holding
that the parent also had no claim under a theory of unjust enrichment. I&. at 497-99.
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where its own and the subsidiary's interests conflicted with each other. 290 This
modified test favors the plaintiff by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
parent.
The business judgment rule was developed to assess the behavior of
directors and officers of independent corporations. It states the rebuttable
presumption that directors and officers act honestly and in good faith if they are
(1) disinterested, (2) independent, and (3) informed. If these prerequisites are
met, a court will not interfere with management decisions unless a plaintiff can
prove some gross and palpable overreaching to the subsidiary's disadvantage.2 9' Consequently, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. As the following two examples illustrate, this burden is very difficult for a shareholder to
overcome this presumption.
In Case v. New York Central R.R.,29 a subsidiary profited while its parent
incurred losses. Because the parent held more than eighty percent of the
outstanding stock of the subsidiary and also occupied all of the latter's major
positions, it was entitled to a consolidated tax return under the existing rules of
the Internal Revenue Code. The tax return resulted in a tax savings for the
subsidiary of about $3.83 million, of which the parent appropriated $3.56
million, leaving the subsidiary with only $270,000.293 The court applied the
business judgment rule and found the agreement to file a consolidated return fair
because the parent did not gain anything at the subsidiary's expense.2"
Therefore, the court rejected this claim of a minority shareholder of the
subsidiary.
In Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,295 the parent corporation used
the subsidiary's losses in a consolidated tax return and did not share the benefits
of the losses with the subsidiary. A minority shareholder brought suit
demanding a fair division of the tax benefits.296 The court rejected the claim
reasoning that the arm's length test would be inapplicable in parent-subsidiary
relations.2 9' Instead it applied the business judgment rule to the fairness of the
tax savings' allocation and held that the rule's boundaries were not crossed.298
Finally, the intrinsic fairness test 9 evolved in situations of "interested"
directors who are represented on both sides of a transaction involving their
corporation. Self-dealing requires that the majority shareholder, by virtue of its

290. Epstein, 174 F.2d at 766; Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954); Goldberg,
supra note 274, at 1228.
291. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 885 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984);
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns
Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963-65 (Ohio 1986).
292. 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965).
293. Id. at 645.
294. Id. at 646-47.
295. 246 A.2d 789 (Del. 1967).
296. Id. at 790.
297. Id. at 794.
298. ld.
299. This test is also referred to as the "compelling business reason" test. Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d
826, 832 (9th Cir. 1982).
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control, receives something to the exclusion and detriment of its subsidiary. 3"
The test also applies where the parent, by virtue of its majority, has the power
to dictate an agreement with the subsidiary. 30 In these situations, the presumption of the business judgment rule 3" cannot be maintained. Consequently, the burden of proof is shifted so that directors must show the transaction is
fair to both corporations.30 3
The intrinsic fairness test is also applicable to fact patterns where a parent
seizes a business opportunity of the subsidiary. The test requires a showing that
(1) the subsidiary had the financial possibility to exercise the opportunity, (2) the
opportunity was within the subsidiary's normal business, and (3) the opportunity
resulted in profits or was of practical advantage to the subsidiary. 31 If the
parent violates these rules and exercises a business opportunity of its subsidiary,
it is held liable to the subsidiary. The subsidiary can then, by application of the
rules of a constructive trust, claim the profits the parent corporation received.3 °5
In David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill International, Inc.,3° the court
confronted two issues. First, the court dealt with a contemplated merger of the
plaintiff minority shareholder's subsidiary into its parent. The parent occupied
most of the subsidiary's directorates, and the court held the intrinsic fairness test
applicable, requiring the defendant to prove the fairness of the merger.
Second, the plaintiff alleged the violation of fiduciary duties owed by the parent
to the subsidiary and its minority shareholders. The claimed violation resulted
because the parent had acquired another company, which was a competitor of the
test and found that the parent
subsidiary. The court applied the intrinsic30fairness
8
had usurped the subsidiary's opportunity.
In Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,3 9 a plaintiff minority shareholder
invoked the intrinsic fairness test. There a majority shareholder, under a
contemplated merger agreement, expected to receive better consideration for his

300. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
301. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 173 F. Supp. 416,420-23
(D.C. 1949).
302. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 595 (Del. 1986).
303. In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 1983); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472,
479 (3d Cir. 1963); Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720; Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261
(Del. Ch. 1982); Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 968-69 (Ohio
1986).
304. SinclairOil Co., 280 A.2d at 722; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (1939); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Dunhill Int'l, 249 A.2d 427, 434 (Del. Ch. 1968); Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 347, 35155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). In this case, a parent purchased a 10% share of the outstanding stock of another
corporation that it wanted to acquire as a whole. The court rejected the claim of a minority shareholder of a
subsidiary, asserting that the acquisition was an opportunity of the subsidiary that the parent should not have
exercised. The court also ield that from the very beginning, the business chance had come to the parent and
thus was one belonging to the parent. Id at 354.
305. Collie v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510, 511.
306. 249 A.2d 427 (Del. 1968).
307. Id. at 429-31.
308. Id. at 434, 435.
309. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. 1986).
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stock than preferred shareholders."' The test was also applied in Burton v.
where, the shareholder opposed the majority's decision to
Exxon Corp.,3
distribute dividends only to a certain class of preferred stock, all of which were
held by the parent majority corporation. Thus, the business judgment rule, which
normally controls the distribution of dividends, 12 could not be relied upon by
the defendant. The court held that the distribution served only the purpose to
shift money from the subsidiary to its parent.
In Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co.," a subsidiary corporation for reasons
of newly enacted federal legislation, lost its rights to import a certain quota of
crude oil because it was a controlled corporation." 4 Since the parent's quota
was not affected, the subsidiary demanded supply from its parent after it had
unsuccessfully opposed the relevant laws.3" 5 The court rejected the application
of the intrinsic fairness test because the subsidiary had suffered the disadvantage
for reasons beyond the parent's control.316 Furthermore, the parent did not
gain anything to the exclusion and detriment of the subsidiary.317 The
subsidiary had to show that the parent's refusal to share its own supplies was
unfair in terms of the business judgment rule. It failed in this respect because
it could not show gross and palpable overreaching.31
In Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien,319 the court also preferred the business
judgment rule to the intrinsic fairness test. A minority shareholder sued the
parent and asserted that the subsidiary was forced to distribute excessive
dividends, which made it impossible for his company to expand its business.
The court rejected the argument that self-dealing by the parent, as a requirement
for the application of the intrinsic fairness test, could be shown solely on the
basis that the parent had held more than ninety percent of the subsidiary's shares.
Self-dealing, according to the court, required damage caused to the subsidiary.
The plaintiff failed because, as a shareholder, he equally benefitted from the
dividends that were in compliance with the relevant statutory rules and which the
court found to be within the limits of legality.320 Interestingly, the court did
apply the intrinsic fairness test to another transaction entered into by the
subsidiary and a third party, in which the parent benefitted.321
The court's result often depends upon the test applied.322 Moreover, the
selection of a test will determine the court's discretion as to the defendant's

310. Id. at 596. However, the court also concluded that this "heightened standard of judicial review" would
not be very difficult for the defendant to overcome. Id.
311. 583 F. Supp. 405, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
312. Id. at 415-16; see also David J. Greene & Co., Inc. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427,430-31 (Del.
1963).
313. 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
314. 1d at 885.
315. Id.
316. A similar argument was given by the court in In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 520 (3d Cir. 1983).
317. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887-88 (Del. 1970).
318. lid. at 888.
319. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
320. Id. at 721-22.
321. Id. at 722-23.
322. Goldberg, supra note 274, at 1225.
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behavior (i.e., the parent's decisions) and, often more importantly, the allocation
of the burden of proof. Furthermore, as the preceding cases show, especially
since Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien,2 3 which has been accepted by most
courts, 324 a plaintiff must meet a substantial burden if he wants to allocate the
burden of proof to the defendant through application of the intrinsic fairness
test. 3' Accordingly, courts will most likely apply the business judgment rule
to parent-subsidiary situations" even if the parent pursues its own interests.
The business judgment rule determines a subsidiary's distribution of dividends,
the parent, and the division of
business opportunities of a subsidiary usurped32 by
benefits received by consolidated tax returns. 7
3.

Piercing the Veil in Parent-Subsidiary Situations

a. General
Piercing the veil is also an issue where a parent company owns 328 and
controls 329 a subsidiary. The corporate law principle of limited liability, also
called entity law, is equally upheld in the context of affiliated companies.330
The issue of disregarding the legal fiction of a subsidiary is governed by the
equitable rules of piercing the veil. Courts apply the same standards in situations
where the principle of limited liability is challenged, and where a creditor seeks
an individual shareholder's obligation for his entity's debts. 331
b. Control
The most significant factor in determining a parent's liability is its control
over the subsidiary company. 332 Courts often question how much control and

323. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
324. Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,
509 A.2d 584, 595 (Del. 1986); Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261 (Del. Ch. 1982); Chasin
v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (Del, Ch. 1971).
325. See Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971). Here, the parent's majority shareholder entered
into a lease agreement with its subsidiary. The plaintiff was a minority shareholder of the subsidiary and the
parent's majority shareholder was a director of the subsidiary. Plaintiff contended that when the parent
defaulted on payments owed to the subsidiary under the agreement, the defendant violated its fiduciary duties
because it did not terminate the agreement and the subsidiary sustained losses. The court did not apply the
intrinsic fairness test because defendant did not benefit from the debts incurred by the subsidiary and,
furthermore, the court found that the agreement had been fair. Id. at 192-93.
326. Goldberg, supra note 274, at 1231-32.
327. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1979).
328. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 18, at 605-11, 623-26 (providing a historical overview
on the emergence of corporate groups); Krendl, supra note 1, at 6 (providing the reasoning for applying the
principle of limited liability in the context of corporate groups).
329. The mere potential of exercising control is not sufficient. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.,
843 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988); Krendl, supra note 1, at 57.
330. Blumberg, Limited Liability, supranote 18, at 575; Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 286,
321.
331. In re Palmer Trading, Inc., 695 F.2d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 1983); HENN, supra note 4, § 148, at 34546; BALLANTINE, supra note 4, § 137; BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 105-06; Blumberg,
CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 288.
332. American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria)
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 841 (Del. 1978); BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 187,
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domination is required to lift the veil between a parent and its subsidiary.
333
Generally, parent companies combine ownership with control of an entity.
Therefore, parent companies cannot be regarded as passive investors who, in
general, are not liable under a doctrine of piercing the veil.33 Moreover, a
parent's liability for reasons of control and domination does not depend on the
extent of its ownership. Courts do not distinguish between partly and whollyowned affiliates.335
i. Interlocking Directorates
Generally, the fact that directors and officers of a parent occupy the same
positions in the subsidiary 336 does not satisfy the requirements for piercing the
subsidiary's veil even if combined with the parent's 100% ownership of the
subsidiary. 337 Identical directorates traditionally occur in parent-subsidiary
situations and cannot be deemed as a sufficient reason to disregard the
subsidiary's limited liability.33 Therefore, directors and officers who are
representing both a parent and its subsidiary are said to "wear the hat' 339 of the
company for which they are acting. Moreover, interlocking directorates do not
prove that a parent company actually exercised domination and control.4
Therefore, they can only be a relevant factor among others.4
ii. Exertion of Influence
In determining the relevance of the control factor, courts often hold that a
parent has to exercise complete control, that the subsidiary no longer pursues its
own interests, or that the subsidiary is merely a division of the parent company.342 However, it is accepted that the parent may determine the subsidiary's

428; Krendl, supra note 1, at 25-26. "If domination cannot be proven, there is no basis for going forward to
other issues." Id. at 25.
333. Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 327; Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 35.
334. See supra note 140.
335. BLUMBERG, SuBsTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 132-33.
336. Id. at 189, 211, 428; Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 36.
337. American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56,60 (2d Cir. 1988); McKinney v. Gannett, 817 F.2d
659, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985); FDIC
v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1982); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th
Cir. 1980); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cit.
1973); North American Plastics v. Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 592 F. Supp. 875, 879 (Miss. 1984); Amsted Indus.,
1978).
Inc. v. Pollak Indus., Inc., 382 N.E. 2d 393, 397 (Ill.
1980); American
338. Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp., 502 F. Supp. 412, 417 (111.
1970).
Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D. Ill.
339. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 691.
340. Krivo Indus. Supply Co., 483 F.2d at 1104.
341. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1988); Krivo Indus. Supply Co.,
483 F.2d at 1109; Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) v. Ashland Oil, Inc, 456 F. Supp. 831, 841 (Del. 1978);
Musman v. Modem Deb, Inc., 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
342. Craig, 843 F.2d at 150; McKinney v. Gannett Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1987); FMC
Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980); Krivo Indus. Supply Co., 483 F.2d at 1106; Banco
de Desarrollo Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs, 709 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Schmidt v. Roehm
GmbH, 544 F. Supp. 272 (Kan. 1982); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria), 456 F. Supp. at 841; Musman, 377
N.Y.S.2d at 20.
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Additionally, the parent may
general policies and exercise supervision."
control the subsidiary's finances and expenses and grant loans.?"
In Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, 5 a Kentucky-based oil company
founded a wholly-owned subsidiary in Nigeria. The court rejected the parent's
liability even though all major positions were held by officers and directors of
the parent, who also had discretion in financial matters including loans and
expenses exceeding $250,000. The court reasoned that the financial plan was
elaborated by the subsidiary, which also had its own accounts within the cash
management program of the parent. Furthermore, the subsidiary paid its own
employees, had assets amounting to seventy million dollars, and controlled its
The court held that the subsidiary was an
own day-to-day management.'
operating company rather than a mere shell, and that it was tolerable for a parent
to centralize common matters of affiliated companies."
Similarly, the court in Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec' did not hold
the parent liable to a subsidiary's employee creditor. The parent had publicly
declared that the subsidiary's merger into the parent was for the purpose of
expanding the parent's business and that it would control the subsidiary's
Additionally, a minority of the subsidiary's directorates was
management."
held by directors of the parent, which controlled the subsidiary's finances as well
as its policy toward dividend distributions.350
In other decisions, courts have held that certain indicators such as arm's
length transactions, separate tax returns, and business activities in different
branches, show that there is no complete control of a subsidiary exercised by its
parent. 35 ' Even if these factors are not present, it does not necessarily follow
that complete control is affirmed. Moreover, courts particularly focus on
whether a parent interferes with the day-to-day business of a subsidiary.352 In
353 a
American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Telephone Workers of Pennsylvania,
union claimed that its labor agreement with a subsidiary also extended to the
defendant subsidiary because both subsidiaries were wholly-owned by the same
parent. The plaintiff argued that the parent's knowledge of the agreement should
be imputed to the defendant. The court rejected the claim and treated the

343. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989); Johnson
v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1987); Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193,
197 (5th Cir. 1983); Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1981); American Trading
& Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D. I11. 1970).
344. Krivo Indus. Supply Co., 483 F.2d at 1104-05, 1110; Schmidt, 544 F. Supp. at 274; Japan Petroleum
Co. (Nigeria), 456 F. Supp. at 841.
345. 456 F. Supp. 831 (Del. 1978).
346. Id. at 844-45.
347. Id. at 845-46.
348. 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988).
349. Id. at 151.
350. Id. at 152.
351. American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412,414 (N.D. M. 1970);
Musman v. Modem Deb, Inc., 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
352. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 155, 165 (N.J. 1983) (rejecting this factor
as being sufficient); Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988); BLUMBERG,
SUBsTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 493.
353. 736 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1984).
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defendant corporation as distinct from its parent although the parent participated
in the subsidiary's management.
In Johnson v. Flowers Industries, Inc.,"' an employee of a subsidiary
sued the parent company and asserted that his labor contract was wrongfully
terminated by the parent. The claim was unsuccessful because the court found
that the parent neither controlled the subsidiary's employment decisions nor its
regular management.35 5 In Schmidt v. Roehm GmbH,356 the court denied a
claim against a parent company which was based on a theory of product liability
of the subsidiary. The court found that the subsidiary did not acquire all of its
products from the parent. Additionally, the court relied on the parent's
manager's357 testimony which indicated that he alone directed the subsidiary's
business.
In McKinney v. Gannett, 38 in contrast, a plaintiff-director of a subsidiary
newspaper corporation which he had formerly owned successfully claimed
benefits under his employment contract. The court found that the parent had
negotiated the contract with the plaintiff, that it had controlled the subsidiary's
finances, and had withdrawn all of the subsidiary's profits.35 9
These decisions indicate that a parent company has wide power to control
its subsidiary without being subject to liability. Although a parent company may
cross the line if it interferes with the day-to-day management 3 ' of the
subsidiary, the control factor alone generally will not result in the parent's
362
liability.3 6 A different outcome may occur where control is excessive,
which is the case if additional factors are found. Most relevant are lack of
indicia of a separate corporate organization, lack ofa compliance with corporate
363
formalities, inadequate capitalization, economic, administrative, and financial
integration (group integration), or the use of a common group public persona (the
use of the same name without conspicuous identification as to the various
entities).
It is'decisive whether the subsidiary could still be regarded as a separate
entity and whether the control exercised by the parent was actual, participatory,
and total.365 Most courts, adhering to the doctrines of alter ego or instrumen-

354. 814 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1987).
Id at 981, 982.
356. 544 F. Supp. 272 (Kan. 1982).
357. Id. at 276.
358. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
359. Id. at 666.
360. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 211-12.
361. Id. at 190, 494; BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 314, 318, 319.
362. BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 351, 494.
363. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1976).
364. Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1983); Schmidt v. Roehm
GmbH, 544 F. Supp. 272 (Kan. 1982); BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, §§ 10-11; Blumberg,
Limited Liability, supra note 18, at 360.
365. Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cit. 1987); Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582,
586 (2d Cir. 1979); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1105-06,
1110 (5th Cir. 1973).
355.
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tality,2 require a further showing of an inequitable result, unfairness, or
injustice, even in situations involving excessive control.3 67
c. Detriments to the Creditor
A plaintiff-creditor who wants to pierce a subsidiary's veil for reasons of
domination must allege the parent's excessive control and furthermore, that
36s
denial of shareholder liability would amount to an inequitable outcome.
Therefore, it is necessary to find factors such as the manipulation of the
subsidiary's finances, undercapitalization, or misrepresentation."
For example, in Edwards Co. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.,370 the court
did not impose contractual liability on a parent and stated that the creditor was
unable to show that the subsidiary was used for fraudulent or abusive practices. 37t Despite the existence of interlocking directorates and complete control,
the court held that the subsidiary had a separate existence apart from the
parent
372
because the two entities' books and minutes had been kept separately.
In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp.,373 the court
held that a subsidiary's contract creditor could pierce the veil. The court held
the parent liable where it regularly caused the subsidiary's debtors to remit
money on its own accounts and withdrew money from the subsidiary's accounts.
The court, affirming that the parent had stripped the subsidiary's assets,374
approved the elements of fraud and wrongdoing.375 Similarly, the courts in

366. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
367. American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Edwards Co. v. Monogram
Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1984); Schmidt, 544 F. Supp. at 275, 277. In Gartner, the court held
that the plaintiff had to show either excessive control or elements of fraud. 607 F.2d at 586. The plaintiff
bought a townhouse from the defendant's corporation which subsequently breached the contract and this suit
arose. Id. at 583, 585. Although the corporation was undercapitalized and dominated by the defendant, the
court refused to pierce the veil because it could neither find fraud nor that the corporations transacting the
defendant's personal business. Id. at 586. In disregarding corporate formalities among the indebted and two
other corporations, where the defendant was also an owner, the court held in dicta that this might only justify
extended liability to the other companies rather than personal liability of the shareholder. Id. at 587-88. This
is similar to the holding in Walkovszky v. Carlton, 233 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). Id. at 587. The court stated
that the creditor could, at most, look for liability in the involved entities. Cf. supra note 41. BLUMBERG,
SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 352, 494; Blumberg, Limited Liabilty, supra note 18, at 360-61.
368. Brown v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 755 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Palmer Trading, Inc., 695 F.2d
1012, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1983); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 1982); Krivo Indus. Supply
Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634
F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (Kan. 1986); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fishback & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
416 (111.1970); Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983). See supra
note 330 and accompanying text.
369. FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc., 753 P.2d
897, 901 (N.M. 1988); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 18, at 361.
370. 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984).
371. Id. at 984.
372. Id. at 985. The same court previously held to the contrary that the subsidiary existed only on paper.
Id. Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 713 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1983).
373. 502 F. Supp. 412 (Il1. 1980).
374. Id. at 416, 418.
375. Id. at 419-20.
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Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M. A. Bell Co.376 and McKinney v. Gannett
37 7
used the argument of asset-stripping in this context to hold the parent
Co.
liable.
When parent and subsidiary enter into transactions detrimental to the
subsidiary, it will have the same effect as siphoning the subsidiary's assets. In
Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v. Merit Ventures, Inc.,378 a parent
founded a subsidiary shipping company that leased ships from another
subsidiary. 379 The court found that the transportation company never had a
chance to make profits due to the overall economic situation. The other
subsidiary, however, profited from the leases. Furthermore, the parent filed for
a consolidated tax return thereby reducing its taxes by the subsidiary's
losses.380 Consequently, the parent was held liable for debts incurred by the
subsidiary.
" ' a parent caused its subsidiary
In Washington National Corp. v. Thomas,38
to offer services of trust agreements in the investment market at below-market
prices. This was conditioned on the subsidiary investing twenty percent of the
money received in other companies of the group. Obviously, the subsidiary
could make no profits, which however, was beneficial to the parent.382 Again,
the parent which previously assumed its subsidiary's debts was held liable.38 3
d. Contract and Tort Creditors
A final question is whether a court in the context of affiliated companies
distinguishes between contract and tort creditors. Contract creditors consent to
the position that they occupy while tort creditors have involuntarily assumed
their position. Thus, if a parent's liability is denied, a contract creditor receives
only what it bargained for when entering into a contract with the debtor
subsidiary. 3
Although the courts do not differentiate between contract and tort creditors,
the pertinent factors of these rules are valued differently.3 ' For example, the
factor of undercapitalization is deemed to be less relevanant in the case of tort
creditors.386 In contrast, the lack of indicia of separate companies is more
important where a creditor has dealt with its debtor. A court may find that this
is a sufficient basis for piercing the veil even in the absence of the parent's
excessive control.387

376. 588 P.2d 463, 475 (Kan. 1978).
377. 817 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cit. 1987).
378. 575 F. Supp. 1442 (5th Cir. 1983).
379. See supra note 141 and acoompanying text.
380. 575 F. Supp. at 1447.
381. 570 P.2d 1268 (Ariz. 1977).
382. Id. at 1274.
383. Id.
384. Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 18, at 618.
385. Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1983); BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE
LAW, supra note 34, at 350, 351.
386.

BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 202, 203, 465.

387. Id. at 351; Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 36.
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Generally speaking, it is more difficult for a contract creditor to pierce the
subsidiary's veil than for a tort creditor.3 88 On the other hand, where a bargain
between creditor and subsidiary did not occur or where the creditor was misled
as to the identity or financial condition of its debtor, performance of a contract
cannot be ordered." 9 Therefore, even a sophisticated creditor such as a bank
may be able to pierce a company's veil, 3' as happened in FDIC v. Sea Pines
391
Co.,
where
the court found supplementing factors in addition to the parent's
392
control.

C. German Law (Konzernrecht)
1. General
The German law of affiliated entities is based on statutory provisions
embodied in AktG sections 15-19 and 291-327. AktG sections 291-327 provide
the legal consequences of domination within the context of affiliated entities.
AktG sections 15-19 define affiliated entities. In other words, the application of
AktG sections 291-327 is limited to affiliated companies as defined in AktG
sections 15-19.393
Although AktG sections 15-19 contain four different types of parentsubsidiary relations all require an Aktiengesellschaft being dominated by another
"Unternehmer," an entity or person pursuing business interests referred to as
"entrepreneur." 39 Since the term Unternehmer has no precise legal definition,
there has been dispute whether an individual can be an entrepreneur in this
context. The Bundesgerichtshofapproved
the question if the owner has further
395
entity.
his
besides
interests
business

388. United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 692, 693 (5th Cit. 1985) (holding in a tort case
that excessive control combined with undercapitalization was a sufficient basis to disregard the subsidiary's
veil); Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1984); Miles, 703 F.2d at 195;
BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 108, 109, 424.
389. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 427, 491; Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note
18, at 621.
390. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 427.
391. 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982).
392. The FDIC's predecessor loaned $250,000 to a subsidiary which had a stated capital of only $1,000
and was controlled by its parent. Id. at 973-74. The court held that the parent violated its duties to the
creditors when it caused the subsidiary, then indebted by some $2 million, to enter into several detrimental
transactions. First, the parent mortgaged the subsidiary's only unencumbered property which was valued at
$350,000 and the parent credited the subsidiary only $8,000. Id. at 977. Furthermore, the parent caused the
subsidiary to terminate a lease arrangement with a third party resulting in the former's relief of a guarantee for
the latter's lease payments. Id. According to the court, these events proved the element of injustice and
unfairness as to the subsidiary's creditors, and it pierced the veil because the lender had no reason to know of
the prospective treatment of the subsidiary when lending the money. Id. at 977, 978.
393. AktG §§ 15-19 applies to other entities as well. See Judgment of Feb. 2, 1981, BGH, 80 BGHZ 69,
72-74; ADoLF BAUMBACH & ALFRED HUECK, GMBH-GEsETZ app. 1, m.no. 3 (15th ed. 1988); Heinz-Dieter
Assmann, Gldubigerschutz im fakrischen GmbH-Konzem durch richterlicheRechtsfortbildung (pts. 1 & 2),
1986 JZ 881, 885, 1986 JZ 928.
394. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1007, 1011.
395. Judgment of Oct. 10, 1977, BGH, 69 BGHZ 334,337; SCHmiDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 785, 786;
Commentary, 1991 NJW 3142, 3143; See also Assmann, supra note 393, at 885, para. 3; Ulmer, supra note
261, at 1581, para. 2; Wolfgang Vormemann, Die Hafung im qualifiziertenfaktischen GmbH-Konzern, 1990
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The most relevant fact pattern involving affiliated entities is contained in
AktG section 18, a Konzern.3" Affiliated entities usually are referred to by the
term Konzern. AktG section 18 requires several companies, either a dominating
and a controlled company or companies independent from each other, being
uniformally directed.397 Other forms of affiliated entities are defined in AktG
sections 16,398 17, 99 and 1 9 .40
AktG sections 291-327 contain various fact patterns of domination and the
These provisions distinguish between (1)
ensuing legal consequences.
domination based on agreements (a contractual Konzern, AktG sections 291310), 40' (2) de facto domination (sections 311-318 AktG), ° and (3) integrated entities (AktG sections 319-327). 4o3 Additionally, there is the concept of
qualified (centralized) de facto domination which has no statutory basis and was
4
developed by the Bundesgerichtshof, in the context of a dominated GmbH.
The concept was also approved by the German constitutional court, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, and held to comply with the constitution. 4
From a creditor's point of view, sections 302, 303, and 317 of the AktG are
most important. Sections 302 and 303 of the AktG, in the context of a
contractual Konzem, state the dominating entity's obligations to assume the
subsidiary's losses and, after terminating the agreement, to provide security for
Under AktG
the creditors' benefits in the amount owed by the subsidiary.'
section 317, with respect to de facto domination, the dominating entity is liable
to the subsidiary for any losses incurred by the subsidiary.

BETRmBS-BERATER 217, 220, para. 1.
396. A brief overview of German Konzern law embodied in the Aktiengesetz is provided in WIR 1993,
supra note 53, at 198 (Box IX.2).
397. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.nos. 14, 15; SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 791-92.
398. AktG § 16 deals with majority ownership.
399. AktG § 17 applies when there is one dominating company and one controlled company. A company
is "controlled" if the other entity can exert its influence, directly or indirectly. Majority ownership carries an
assumption that control can be exerted. AktG § 17, para. 2. The distinguishing element as to AktG § 18 is
its lack of uniform direction. See SCHMiDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 789-91.
400. AktG § 19 describes entities which own at least a twenty-five percent share of one another. See
SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 793.
401. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 155-58.
402. Id. at 158-63. For the differences between contractual and de facto domination, see ROWEDDER, supra
note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 16; SCmIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 405-08.
403. Integrated entities are of less practical relevance and thus not mentioned further. Under AktG § 319,
an Aktiengesellschaft can be integrated into another company if the prospective controlling company holds
ninety-five percent of the Aktiengesellschaft's shares. This gives the dominating company even more
controlling power than a domination agreement. See infra part IV.B.3.d. However, there are still two separate
entities, although factually the situation is close to a merger. In general, the controlling company must assume
all obligations of the dominated company. See AktG §§ 321-22.
404. Five cases have become famous in this respect. Judgment of Sept. 16, 1985, BGH, 95 BGHZ 330;
Case Commentary, 1980 NJW 231 [hereinafter Gervais, 1980 NJW 231]; Case Commentary, 1986 NJW 188
[hereinafter Autokran, 1986 NJW 188]; Case Commentary, 1989 NJW 1880 [hereinafter Tiejbau, 1989 NJW
1800]; Case Commentary, 1991 NJW 3142 [hereinafter Video, 1991 NJW 3142]; Friedrich Kiibler, Case
Comment, 1993 NJW 1200 [hereinafter TBB, 1993 NJW 1200]. These cases are described infra notes 502-39
and accompanying text.
405. Case Commentary, 1993 NJW 2600 [hereinafter 1993 NJW 2600]. This decision occurred in the
context of Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404.
406. See infra note 514.
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are
AktG sections 291-327, as opposed to AktG sections 15-19,'
applicable where an Aktiengesellschaft (a corporation) is the dominated entity.
Although no pertinent provisions in the GmbHG regarding a controlled GmbH
exist, case law was developed by the Bundesgerichtshof,40 8 starting with its
decision in ITT.' The rules differ from those respecting an Aktiengesellschaft,
especially AktG sections 302 and 303, are applied to
although some provisions,
410
a GmbH by analogy.
The various fact patterns involving domination, such as contractual Konzern,
de facto Konzern, and qualified de facto Konzern occur in the context of
Aktiengesellschaft or GmbH. However, the entity form of a GmbH is more
relevant as to de facto and, especially, qualified de facto domination, whereas
domination agreements are primarily discussed with respect to an Aktiengesellschaft.41' The reason is found in the different rules of the GmbHG and the
AktG regarding the relation of ownership and management under the two entity
forms. Whereas the management of a GmbH4 2 is subject to the directions of
the members (GmbHG sections 37, paragraph 1, 46 numbers 5, 6) making
explicit agreements less important, the board of directors of an Aktiengesellschaft, the Vorstand,4 13 is only bound by its own discretion under AktG section

76, paragraph 1, regardless of whether the company is independent or part of a
Konzern.4 t4 Accordingly, majority ownership of an Aktiengesellschaft does not
necessarily imply power to control and its exertion.
Again the law in the context of affiliated entities bears the presumption that
control, combined with entrepreneurial interests of the dominating party, is
disadvantageous to the controlled entity and its creditors as to justify the
former's obligations. 5 Therefore, the application of these provisions is not
dependent on a creditor's knowledge of its debtor's financial condition or
whether an obligation arose out of tort or contract.416 Due to the nexus to
entrepreneurial interests embodied in AktG sections 15-19, the statutory sections
can only be invoked if majority ownership or domination of an entity are

407. AktG §§ 15-19 are also applicable to other entities such as a GmbH. See supra note 393.
408. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 415, 1006-07; Assmann, supra note 393, at 882; Ulmer, supra
note 261, at 1579; Vonnemann, supra note 395, at 217; Cf.supra note 404.
409. Peter Ulmer, Case Comment, 1976 NJW 191 [hereinafter ITT, 1976 NJW 191]; see infra note 447
(mentioning ITT in the context of de facto domination).
410. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 3; DROKE, supra note 166, at 91.
411. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 7.
412. The Geschaeftsfuehrer manages and represents the GmbH. See GmbHG §§ 35-52 (notably § 35, para.

1).
413. The "Vorstand' of an Aktiengesellschaft (AktG §§ 76-94) manages and represents an Aktiengesellschaft. Other bodies are the "Aufsichtsrat," which is the supervisory board over the management (AktG §§
95-116, notably § 111, para. 1), and the "Gesellschafterversammlung," which is the shareholder's assembly
(AktG §§ 118-47).
414. SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 411, 675, 892, para. 2; Horst Konzen Geschdftsfuehrung,
Weisungsrecht und Verantwortlichkeit in der GmbH und GmtbH & Co.KG, 1989 NJW 2977, 2780.
415. Cf supra part IlI.D.
416. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 786, 1008.
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connected to business goals outside the subsidiary, which cause the subsidiary's
interests to be sacrificed by the parent." 7
The following describes the various fact patterns of control and domination
within affiliated entities and the legal consequences. The text distinguishes
between Aktiengesellschaft and GmbH.
2.

Contractual Konzern - Vertragskonzern

a. Aktiengesellschaft
Under AktG section 291, paragraph 1, an Aktiengesellschaft may submit
itself through an explicit domination agreement to another company's direction.418 The statute assumes the existence of a Konzern as defined in AktG
section 184' 9 and the
two entities are referred to as a Vertragskonzern or
420
contractual Konzern.
AktG section 308, paragraph 1, sentence 1, enables the parent corporation
to instruct the board of directors of the Aktiengesellschaft.42' This power
includes giving instructions that are detrimental to the subsidiary (AktG section
308, paragraph 1, sentence 2).422 However, in limiting the parent's discretion,
the instructions must be beneficial to the overall interests of the Konzern.423
The parent will be held liable to the subsidiary for any damages caused by
violating these rules.42 4
As a further safeguard to the subsidiary's interests, the dominating
company's managers must exercise control in an orderly and diligent manner
(AktG section 309, paragraph 1). If the managers violate these rules, they must
reimburse the subsidiary for the damages incurred (AktG section 309, paragraph
2).425 A claim for damages under AktG section 309, paragraph 2, can be
asserted by the dominated entity, its shareholders, or by the creditors if they
cannot obtain satisfaction from the debtor corporation (AktG section 309,
paragraph 4).
From a creditor's point of view, sections 302 and 303 of the AktG are more
significant than a possible violation of AktG section 308, the domination
agreement, or a claim under AktG section 309. AktG section 302 states that the

417. If the statutory provisions are not applicable, the rules of piercing the veil, Durchgriffshaftung,may
apply.
418. Under AktG § 292, the entities may also make other agreements. An example may be a profit-transfer
agreement under which the dominated corporation transfers any profit to the parent corporation for tax
purposes. The parent will then be permitted to assign the profits to its own financial balance sheets. See
KORPERSCHAFrSSTEUERGESErZ §§ 14, 17 (German corporate tax code); ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh.,
m.nos. 19-20; SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 800, para. 3.
419. Compare AktG § 18, para. 1, sent. 1, with supra part IV.Cl.
420. The legal term is "Vertragskonzern." Compare SCHMIDr, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 794, para. 3, with
1009, para. 2.
421. AktG §§ 76-94.
422. SCHMiDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 797; Bonanno, supra note 264, at 157.
423. AktG § 308, para. 1.
424. The liability will be based on the equitable rules of "positive Vertragsverletzung" (pW), violation
of contractual duties. See DROKE, supranote 166, at 93. For pVV in general, see PALANDT-HEINRCHS, supra
note 66, § 278, m.nos. 104-29.
425. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 158.

1995]

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

parent corporation is obliged to pay for all losses the dominated Aktiengesellschaft incurred in a taxable year.4 26 Thus, it can be said that a subsidiary's
creditor is a creditor of the Konzern, its only concern has to be whether the
Konzern is able to meet the subsidiary's obligations.4 27 After termination of
a contractual Konzern, a creditor is protected by AktG section 303, which states
the parent's obligation to provide guarantees amounting to the creditors' claims
against the subsidiary.
AktG sections 302 and 303, generally do not entitle a creditor to a direct
claim against the parent corporation. However, the domination agreement is
deemed to be terminated if the subsidiary files for bankruptcy. If further
proceedings are not instituted 428 and payments are not made by the indebted
entity, a creditor has a direct action under AktG section 303, paragraph 1 against
the parent corporation.429
b. GmbH
The provisions of the AktG apply directly only to a dominated Aktiengesellschaft regardless of whether the parent is an Aktiengesellschaft, a GmbH, or a
sole shareholder.430 However, it is more likely that a GmbH is controlled than
an Aktiengesellschaft due to the rules regarding management and management's
subordination to directions.43 ' There may also be a domination agreement
over
the GmbH, although for the same reasons, thus it will
facilitating control 43
2
not often be found.
Although no statutory provisions exist, there is no dispute that a domination
agreement with a GmbH is equally legal and binding. 33 Moreover, the
dominating entity, by virtue of the agreement, is entitled to the same powers over
the GmbH as the rules of the AktG provide. Accordingly, the GmbH is obliged
to follow instructions,, unless detrimental to the overall interests of the
Konzern.4' The dominated GmbH most likely will no longer pursue its own
interests, but will be controlled in a manner to achieve benefits for the Konzern.
The parent's liabilities follow the rules applicable to an Aktiengesellschaft. 435 Thus, according to AktG section 302, the dominating company must

426. SCHMInr, GESEiiR, supra note 9, at 798-99. AktG §§ 302, 303 will be described in more detail.
See infra note 514 and accompanying text.
427. DROKE, supra note 166, at 95.
428. This is a case where the assets are not sufficient to meet the expenses of the proceedings. See
KONKURSORDNUNG [KO] § 204, para. 1.
429. E.g., Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 192; DROKE, supra note 166, at 96, 97; Ulmer,
supra note 261, at 1582.
430. Cf. supra part IV.B.3.b.
431. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1006-07; See supra part IV.B.3.b.
432. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 39.
433. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 27; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.nos. 19, 20;
SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1009-10; Commentary, 1989 NJW 295, 296, para. 4 (two GmbHs had
concluded domination and profit-transfer agreements); Konzen, supra note 414, at 2978, 2981.
434. DROKE, supra note 166, at 97; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.nos. 63-64.
435. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 67; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1009; Konzen,
supra note 414, at 2981.
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reimburse the subsidiary for all losses sustained.436 Under AktG section 303,
after termination of the contractual Konzern, the dominant company is obliged
to provide creditors with guarantees that become effective if the subsidiary
defaults.437
3. De facto Konzern
The advantage of a domination agreement under German law is that there
is statutory certainty as to the parties' duties and liabilities,4 3' especially with
respect to the dominating company's assumption of obligations (AktG sections
302 and 303) which exist regardless of any specified damage caused to creditors
by the control. However, entities are also affiliated without explicit agreements.
In these situations, a court must investigate whether an exercised control was
sufficiently tight and disadvantageous to the subsidiary to justify parent's
liability. In the absence of domination agreements, German corporate law
distinguishes between de facto Konzern4 39 and qualified (centralized) de facto
Konzern,44° the latter having been defined by the courts, notably the Bundesgerichtshof,and commentators.
Qualified de facto domination involves a higher degree of domination than
de facto domination and comes close to a contractual Konzern. The legal
consequences are similar to the situation in a contractual Konzern.4" Under
de facto domination, the law provides only for a subsidiary's claim for damages
resulting from a particular transaction. Accordingly, the parent is not directly
liable to a creditor who may only assert the debtor entity's claim. Moreover, the
subsidiary has the burden of proof. Because of the difficulty stating a cause of
action, which requires proof of the transaction's disadvantage to the subsidiary
including specific damages incurred, commentators view the legal means in a de
facto Konzern as ineffective." 2
a. Aktiengesellschaft
If the dominated company is an Aktiengesellschaft AktG sections 311 and
317 are applicable. These sections provide that the parent is liable to the
subsidiary for all losses and damages incurred by the subsidiary in transactions
where the parent is responsible. 43 A subsidiary, a shareholder, or the subsidiary's creditors may bring a claim. 4 " In order to ascertain whether damages
have occurred, AktG section 312 states that the subsidiary's board in a
dependency report must list and describe all transactions entered into with the

436. Schmidt, Insolvenzrisiko, supra note 161, at 306.
437. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.nos. 27(a), 28.
438. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 175.
439. Id. at 158.
440. See infra parts IV.C.3.a & b.
441. See supra part IV.C.I.
442. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 802; see infra parts IV.C.2.b & IV.C.3.
443. SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 805; Assmann, supra note 393, at 886, para. 3(a); Bonanno,
supra note 264, at 161; Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1580, para. 1.
444. AktG §§ 309, para. 4, 317, para. 4.
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parent, affiliated companies, or with other legal subjects on behalf of the
parent." 5
b. GmbH
The provisions of the GmbHG do not contain rules governing de facto
domination. Nonetheless, a GmbH must be protected like a de facto Konzern. 446 The proposal to apply the relevant provisions of the AktG, sections
311 and 317, has not prevailed because the underlying situations are too different. 7 For example, the GmbHG lacks rules as provided in AktG sections
313-315, which in a detailed manner describe requirements of accountant
approval of the annual reports thereby effectuating protection for minority
shareholders and creditors. 448
As in American law, the parent" 9 owes fiduciary duties to the subsidiary,
when exercising its managerial powers. 450 These fiduciary duties also exist in
a Konzern and are not suspended by virtue of such a context. The parent is not
privileged because of its domination over the subsidiary.45
A parent company violating its fiduciary duties is liable to the subsidiary
for the resulting damages.452 The GmbH's claim for damages may be brought
by the GmbH, a minority member,453 or by a creditor of the subsidiary if it
cannot obtain satisfaction from the debtor entity. 4 4 Although a subsidiary's
cause of action is asserted in this context, creditors of the subsidiary also derive
benefits because the debtor entity's assets increase.455
A different situation exists where a parent is the sole member. According
to most commentators, a company has no rights per se as to its existence. They
argue that a sole member, able to dissolve its company, owes no fiduciary duties
to the company.4 56 Here, creditors can only resort to other rules such as

445. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 162.
446. Gervais, 1980 NJW 231, supra note 404, at 232; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1011.
447. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 190, para. 4; ITT, 1976 NJW 191, supra note 409;
BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 34; Assmann, supra note 393, at 886, paras. (b)-(c); Ulmer, supra note
261, at 1582, para. (b); Herbert Wiedemann, Die Bedeutung der ITT-Entscheidung, 1976 JZ 392, 394-95.
448. DROKE, supra note 166, at 121; Assmann, supra note 393, at 928, para. 1(a).
449. Konzen, supra note 414, at 2981.
450. As discussed, contrary to the situation in an Aktiengesellschaft, the officers in a GmbH are subject
to the members' directions. GmbHG § 37, para. 1.
451. ITT, 1976 NJW 191, supra note 409, at 191; BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 10; DROKE, supra
note 166, at 122; Konzen, supra note 414, at 2985, para. (b).
452. ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 49; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1013; Konzen,
supra note 414, at 2981.
453. ITT, 1976 NJW 191, supra note 409, at 192, para. 2.; BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 15;
Wiedemann, supra note 447, at 395. In general, if a shareholder sues, it is called an actio pro societate, and
the benefits are received by the company. See LuTrrR, supra note 10, § 13, m.no. 3; PALANDT-HEINRICHS,
supra note 66, § 705, m.no. 20; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 519.
454. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 192; DROKE, supra note 166, at 123; Assmann, supra
note 393, at 929, para. (c).
455. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 27(a); Assmann, supra note 393, at 929; Ulmer, supra note 261,
at 1581, para. 3(a).
456. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 190, para. 4., 191, parn. 5(c); BAUMBACH, supra note
393, at m.nos. 10, 35; Stimpel, supra note 15, at 613-14.
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GmbHG sections 30-32(b) (preservation of stated capital), 45 7 BGB section
826,458 or piercing the subsidiary's veil as described in the preceding chapters
of this paper.4" 9 Other commentators argue for equal application of fiduciary
duties owed by a sole owner to his company and may, as in the situation
involving several owners, hold the parent liable to the dominated GmbH and its
creditors in a situation of de facto domination. 4'
c. Realization of a Claim
Although a dependent company or its shareholders may have a claim against
the parent, the imposition of liability in de facto domination is very difficult to
realize. 6 The difficulty lies in singling out specific transactions detrimental
to the subsidiary, despite the dependency report found in AktG section 312. A
shareholder or creditor, as plaintiff, must have knowledge of the facts that caused
damage to the subsidiary.
i. Retrieving relevant information
The majority shareholder, equipped with superior knowledge, will be of
little support. Furthermore, unlike American law, German law of civil procedure
requires a plaintiff to present all the pertinent facts necessary to prevail in a suit.
There is no pretrial 462 proceeding under German law which would enable a
plaintiff-creditor to gain the relevant knowledge. The plaintiff-creditor has a
right only to receive and to sue for information from the debtor company if it
has a material claim for damages. Therefore, it must present sufficient facts.
Under the provisions of the AktG, shareholders have no particular rights to
inspect the company's books and minutes relating to situations where their
company is part of a Konzern. These rights are vested in the accountants, 3
who are entitled to comprehensive information,' whereas a shareholder is
restricted 465 to receiving information during the shareholder meeting. Additionally, shareholders may demand for the appointment of accountants for special
purposes at the competent court. 46
GmbHG section 51 (a) provides the members' general right to information
including the inspection of the GmbH's books and records. This right, under
GmbHG section 51 (a), is deemed to be extensive and to extend to relations with

457. See supra note 164.
458. BGB § 826 requires a tortious act committed in bad faith.
459. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 34; DROKE, supra note 166, at 123.
460. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1012; Assmann, supra note 393, at 931, para. (c); Schmidt, Zum
Haftungsdurchgriff,supra note 227, at 2077. These authors argue that relations between GmbH and its sole
member also impact third parties such as creditors. Therefore, no distinction should be drawn as to a GmbH
having minority members.

461. SCHMIDT, GESELLR supra note 9, at 802; Assmann, supra note 393, at 931, para. (d).
462. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (providing for depositions, interrogatories, and the production of
documents). See, e.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (showing
evidence that encompassed some 10,000 pages of testimony and 1,000 exhibits).
463. AktG §§ 313-15.
464. HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] § 320.
465. AktG § 131.
466. AktG § 315.
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affiliated companies. 67 Creditors have no rights to inspect a company's
documents. They depend upon the actions taken by the minority owners and are
rather helpless if there is no request under AktG section 315 or GmbHG section
51(a). 8
Although German law requires an Aktiengesellschaft and GmbH to release
comprehensive information to the owners, the owners must overcome more
obstacles in bringing a claim against their entity than American shareholders or
members, especially in an Aktiengesellschaft where rights are granted to the
accountants rather than the shareholders. A subsidiary's creditor, having less
access to relevant information possessed by the parent and the debtor company,
has even more difficulties. Suggestions to allocate the burden of proof to the
dominating entity, according to which the exercise of domination is assumed to
be detrimental to the subsidiary, might be helpfil. 4 9
ii. Damages Caused to the Subsidiary
In addition to retrieving relevant information, a creditor or shareholder must
also show that his subsidiary company suffered damages.470 AktG section 317,
4 71
paragraph 2, states a test comparable to the American arm's length test,
which determines that a parent will not be liable if an independent company
would also have entered into the transaction. By analogy, the rule is applicable
to a GmbH.4 72
A court must investigate whether the subsidiary recieved adequate
compensation in a transaction with its parent company. The comparable market
price is the applicable standard,473 however, there is often no comparable
data.474 Following the statutory wording, a court must decide whether an
independent company would have entered into the same transaction. Obviously,
uncertainty is involved here as well as where a court must determine the exact
amount of damages suffered by the subsidiary. Even accountants who are
entitled to full information47 admit that it is difficult to determine whether a
transaction within a Konzern was fair.476
4.

Qualified De Facto Konzern

a. General
German courts and commentators agree that qualified de facto domination
requires special protection for creditors.477 Qualified domination refers to

467. DROKE, supra note 166, at 128-29; Commentary, 1986 WERTPAPIER-MrrrILUNGEN 36, 39.
468. DROKE, supra note 166, at 127.
469. Assmann, supra note 393, at 932.
470. AktG §§ 311, 317.
471. See infra part IV.A.
472. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 191, para. b; DROKE, supra note 166, at 133.
473. DROKE, supra note 166, at 132 (citing I wIRTSCHAFrsPROFER-HANDBUCH 708).
474. See infra parts IV.A-B (discussing U.S. law).
475. See supra note 463.
476. DROKE, supra note 166, at 135 (citing I WIRTSCHAFrSPROFER-HANDBUCH 709).
477. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404; Tiefbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802; Autokran,
1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 191, para. b; Gervais, 1980 NJW 231, supra note 404, at 232; SCHMIDT,
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situations where the parent company permanently interferes with a subsidiary's
conduct in an unrestricted manner. It is no longer possible to single out
particular transactions detrimental to the subsidiary as in a de facto Konzern.4 78
The situation is similar to a contractual Konzern, 479 and the relevant statutory
rules of the Aktiengesetz can be applied by analogy.80 Contrasted to a de
facto Konzern, the main difference is the presumption that the parent's control
is detrimental because of its total domination. 4 l The parent's liability,
accordingly, exists because of the given circumstances, regardless of its intent or
the specified damages incurred by the subsidiary.4 2
b. Aktiengesellschaft and GmbH
A qualified de facto Konzern may occur with respect to both legal entity
The distinction between a de facto and a qualified de facto Konzern
forms.
can be drawn regardless of whether the dominated company is an Aktiengesellschaft or a GmbH.
However, it will be a GmbH rather than an Aktiengesellschaft that is a
dominated subsidiary.4 ' The provisions of the GmbHG, section 37, paragraph
1, and section 46 paragraphs 5 and 6, enable the GmbH's members to direct the
Geschaeftsfuehrung (the management) whereas the Vorstand of an Aktiengesellschaft (the board of directors) is independent from shareholder instructions (AktG
section 76, paragraph 1).485
Because of the statutory discretion vested in the Vorstand, it is disputed
whether comprehensive domination of an Aktiengesellschaft, amounting to a
qualified de facto Konzern, is legal in the absence of an agreement. 6 It is,
however, recognized that this context may also occur with respect to an
Aktiengesellschaft, although of much less practical relevance, and it is proposed
that the rules follow those applicable to a GmbH.487
48
The entity form of a GmbH is regarded as an ideal subsidiary company.
Consequently, regardless of the question of legality, an Aktiengesellschaft will
not yet be often dominated in a qualified de facto Konzern.489 The cases
decided by the Bundesgerichtshofinvolving the question of how to define a

GESELLR, supra note 9, at 805, 1015; Wolfram Timm, Grundfragen des "qualifizierten"faktischenKonzerns
im Aktienrecht, 1987 NJW 977, at 980.
478. Konzen, supra note 414, at 2986, para. b.
479. AktG §§ 291; Tiejbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802-03; BAtMBACH, supra note 393,
at m.no. 29; Assmann, supra note 393, at 932, para. a.
480. This analogy must be applied "in a careful manner." See Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404,
at 191; Assmann, supra note 393, at 932.
481. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 189, para. 1.
482. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1015, 1018; Konzen, supra note 414, at 2986; Ulmer, supra note
261, at 1581.
483. Timm, supra note 477, at 978-80, para. I.
484. ROwEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.no. 7.
485. SCHMmrD, GEsaLLR, supra note 9, at 675, 892, para. 2.
486. Id. at 806.
487. Id. at 806-07.
488. ld at 1006.
489. Id. at 806.
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qualified de facto Konzern were all in the context of a GmbH. Accordingly, the
following discussion focuses on situations where a GmbH is dominated.
c. Definition
As in American law,49° courts and commentators believe that single
factors, such as interlocking directorates do not justify the assumption of a
qualified de facto Konzern.491 Additionally, these interlocking directorates are
permissible under German corporate law, regardless of whether the company is
an Aktiengesellschaft or a GmbH.4'
AktG section 76, paragraph 3 states that
any individual can be a member of the Vorstand.493 AktG section 88, paragraph 1, referring to members of the Vorstand who occupy similar positions at
other entities, indicates that the legislator recognized the issue of interlocking
directorates. A similar rule exists regarding a GmbH. GmbHG section 6,
paragraphs 2 and 3, state that any member or other individual can be Geschaeftsfuehrer49 of the company. Although the factor of interlocking directorates
does not justify the assumption that a qualified de facto Konzern exists, they are
regarded as significant evidence.
Courts and most commentators, rather than focusing on formalities such as
the amount of shares or interlocking directorates, look to the owners' material
influence on the activities of the dominated entity. Material influence is defined
as a permanent influence that is extensive and evaporates assets of the dominated
entity, and will be affirmed if the subsidiary is merely a subdivision of the
parent.4 95 Contrary to the analysis regarding a de facto Konzern, it is not
necessary to focus on particular detrimental measures to the subsidiary.4"
Some commentators,497 with respect to an Aktiengesellschaft, require
permanent disadvantages suffered by the subsidiary in addition to control.
However, most commentators believe that extensive control gives rise to the
presumption of a situation detrimental to the subsidiary.498 The Bundesgerichtshof, in its decisions in TieJbau499 and Video,500 concurred in this analysis but
held that the parent has the possibility to escape liability5 0 1
A qualified de facto Konzern can be presumed if one of the three main
departments of a company, such as production, acquisition, and sales, is

490. Cf. supra part IV.B.2.
491. Tiefbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1803; BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 30; DROKE,
supra note 166, at 159.
492. DROKE, supra note 166, at 153-54; Timm, supra note 477, at 984-86.
493. See supra note 413.
494. See supra note 412.
495. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404, at 3144; Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404; Gervais,
1980 NJW 231, supra note 404; BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 30; ScHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9,
at 1015, para. a.
496. Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1584.
497. Timm, supra note 477, at 980, para. II, 987, para. VII.
498. SCHMIDT, GEsEuLR, supra note 9, at 1017-18; ROWEDDER, supra note 15, § 52 Anh., m.nos. 16,
61(a); Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1584, para. 2.
499. Tiejbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802, para. 3.
500. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404, at 3144, para. b.
501. See infra notes 525-27.
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comprehensively controlled by the parent company. Furthermore, centralized
management of the finances directed by the parent will most likely be deemed
0 3
2
sufficient in this regard. 50 However, most recently the Bundesgerichtshof
changed its position, holding that circumstances indicating comprehensive control
are not sufficient to justify the imposition of shareholder liability. The court
now requires an abusive exertion of control.
The following cases decided by the Bundesgerichtshofprovide illustrations.
They also show that the court has taken different approaches over the years.
In Gervais/Danone50 4 a partnership for business purposes, an offene
Handelsgesellschaft (oHG), °5 when suffering financial hardship, submitted 5°
itself to an Aktiengesellschaft that operated in the same market. The partnership,
managed and controlled by the Aktiengesellschaft, was subsequently transformed
into a GmbH & Co.KG, a limited partnership5 7 having a limited liability
company as general partner. The shares were held by the owners of the former
partnership and the Aktiengesellschaft. The Bundesgerichtshof,pointing to the
specific threats to the dominated entity, the interests might be sacrificed for the
parent's benefit, 8 concluded that the Aktiengeselschaft had to assume the
dependent company's debts.t 9
In another famous case, referred to as Autokran,5S 0 the plaintiff entered
into leasing contracts with seven GmbHs, all of which were dominated and
managed by the defendant owner. All the financial management, including
books and minutes, was handled by a separate GmbH that was also controlled
by the defendant. Furthermore, the latter holding company held contracts with
all the other GmbHs, according to which the holding GmbH was entitled to all
of the other entities' claims against their clients including all the profit. As
compensation, the holding GmbH assumed all debts and obligations, such as
wages, of the other companies. When the companies defaulted on the lease
payments, the plaintiff terminated the contracts and obtained judgments against
the debtor companies amounting to DM 700,000. However, the plaintiff
collected only
DM 44,000 from the debtors and brought suit against the
51
defendant.
The Bundesgerichtshof,confirming that an individual can be regarded as an
entrepreneur under AktG section 18,5 2 argued for a qualified de facto Konzern

502. Tiefbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1803, para. b; DROKE, supra note 166, at 164.
503. TBB, 1993 NJW 1200, supra note 404, at 1203.
504. Gervais, 1980 NJW 231, supra note 404.
505. An oHG is a business partnership of having unlimited liability. HGB § 105.
506. This submission was done through a contractual agreement; however, this agreement did not qualify
as a domination agreement under AktG § 291. Therefore, the case is generally cited in the context of a
qualified de facto Konzern. See SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 406, para. a.
507. A limited partnership is called a Kommanditgesellschaft (KG). See HGB § 161.
508. Gervais, 1980 NJW 231, supra note 404, at 231, para. a, 232.
509. 1l Furthermore, the court mentioned the possibility of applying AktG § 302 by analogy to reach this
result. Id.
510. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404.
511. Id. at 188.
512. Id. at 190, para. 2. AktG § 18 defines a Konzern. Cf. supra note 396.
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because of the defendant's tight domination of his companies .5 3 The court
applied AktG section 303 by analogy and held the defendant liable.1 4
Moreover, the plaintiff had a direct claim against the defendant because the
debtor entities had been unable to make payments. Furthermore, there was only
one member, the defendant, owning the companies which were disregarded. 5
Additionally, the court also allowed the defendant to prove, under AktG
section 317, paragraph 2,516 that the holding company's actions were similar
to those an independent company would have undertaken. 5 7 Although the
defendant could not win on merit under AktG section 317, paragraph 2, this
holding was greatly criticized.51 8 This criticism was due to the different
situations of a de facto and a qualified de facto Konzem, the latter's circumstancKonzern. The reasoning was
es being factually similar to a contractual
19
subsequently abandoned in Tiefbau.
In Tiefbau, z° the Bundesgerichtshof again decided a case involving a
qualified de facto Konzern. The defendant-bank caused a sole proprietor debtor,
owning and managing a construction business to convert into a GmbH when the
business defaulted on bank loans. The bank subsequently controlled and
dominated the GmbH. 52' The court held the defendant-bank liable as one of
several owners of the newly created GmbH because it controlled all financial
matters.522 The defendant under AktG section 302, applied by analogy,
assumed all losses and debts of the GmbH. Since the plaintiff was the
bankruptcy liquidator of the GmbH, and thus asserted the debtor company's
rights against the parent, he had a direct claim against the defendant bank.
Therefore, an application of AktG section 303, providing guarantees to the
dominated debtor entity , and in exceptional cases, providing a creditor's direct
claim,523 was irrelevant because the plaintiff would not have attained further
benefits.524

513. Id. at 190, paras. 2, 3, 5.
514. AktG § 303 requires the dominating entity after termination of a Konzern to provide guarantees for
the creditors of the Aktiengesellschaft. The guarantees become effective if the debtor defaults on its obligations.
Applicable during the period of the existence of a Konzern, AktG § 302 provides the dominating entity's duty
to assume all losses incurred by the Aktiengesellschaft during a financial year. Both sections state a claim of
the subsidiary against the dominating entity as opposed to claims of the creditors. See Schmidt, Insolvenzrisiko,
supra note 161, at 306. However, this principle is not always applied. As has been said, the sections are
directly applicable to a dominated Aktiengesellschaft in a contractual Konzern and, by analogy, also to a GmbH
and in the context of a qualified de facto Konzern. See supra parts IV.C.2.a & IV.C.3.
515. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 190, paras. 4-5(a), 192, para. 2. The court posed, but
did not answer, the question whether § 302 AktG would also be applicable in a case like the one at bar, where
the subsidiary is wholly owned. leL However, this was approved. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404.
516. Applied by analogy, the code section relates to a de facto Konzern. Cf. supra part IV.C.3.
517. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 191, para. b.
518. SCHMrDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 806, 1015; Assmann, supra note 393, at 934-35; Schmidt, Zum
Haftungsdurchgriff,supra note 227, at 2077; Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1583-84, para. 3.
519. Cf. infra note 520.
520. Tiejbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404.
521. Id. at 1800.
522. Id. at 1803, para. b.
523. See, e.g., Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404.
524. Tieflau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1801, para. 3.
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As in Autokran,2 the court rejected an analogous application of AktG
section 317, paragraph 2,526 and reasoned for the dominating shareholder's
general liability in a qualified de facto Konzem. However, the court allowed a
parent company to prove527that the subsidiary's losses were not caused by its
control and management.
In Video,528 the Bundesgerichtshofheld for a qualified de facto Konzem
and imposed liability on the defendant parent. The plaintiff was in the business
of copying videos and had a claim for DM 1.4 million against a GmbH owned
and managed by the defendant. The defendant was also engaged in other
businesses. The court again ruled that the defendant, as an individual entrepreneur, met the requirements of a Konzern as defined in AktG section 18.529
Furthermore, the court found a qualified de facto Konzern to be present since the
defendant was manager and sole owner of the debtor GmbH. 530 The court held
the defendant liable under AktG section 303.531 Moreover, the plaintiff was
entitled to a direct claim because the section's rule to provide guarantees for the
creditor's benefit was no longer meaningful when it became clear that the GmbH
would be unable to pay off its debts.532
Finally, the court decided TBB 533 where the defendant was sole manager
of the debtor construction company, a GmbH owned by his wife. The court first
held that it was possible to impute the wife's position to the defendant if he had
completely controlled the debtor entity and to view him as the factual member
The court then, in contrast to the decisions in Video and
of GmbH. 5'
Autokran, took a different approach and clarified its previous holdings.
Following the court, the defendant, despite extensive domination, could only be
personally liable if control of the GmbH was abusive. Abuse, according to the
court, would require an exertion of control that disregarded the dominated
entity's interests in such a way that it was impossible to compensate single
disadvantages suffered by the GmbH. 535 Furthermore, with respect to rules of
burden of proof and presentation of facts, the court required the plaintiff only to
establish a prima facia case. Consequently, the defendant, having all the inside
knowledge, had to show sufficient facts under which he would not be liable.536

525. See supra part IV.C.3.b.ii.
526. This code section, in the context of de facto domination, excludes liability of the dominating entity
if it can show and prove that a diligent and independent manager would have entered into the transaction with
the subsidiary.
527. Tiejbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802, para. 3(a).
528. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404.
529. Id. at 3143, para. 1(a).
530. Id. at 3144, para. c(aa).
531. Id. at 3145, para. 3(a).
532. Id. at 3145, para. b.
533. TBB, 1993 NJW 1200, supra note 404.
534. Id. at 1201-02.
535. Id. at 1203.
536. Id.
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Since the facts were insufficiently investigated and the court had adopted new
rules, the case was remanded for further proceedings.537
d. Legal Consequences
As the legal consequences of a qualified de facto Konzem, reflect the
application of AktG sections 302 and 303 are applied. Thus, the imposition of
liabilities on the dominating owner is similar to the situation in a contractual
Konzern. 3
If the Konzern-affiliated subsidiary has several owners, the subsidiary has
a claim under AktG section 302, against the dominating owner to assume its
debts and losses.539 This claim belongs to the subsidiary' " and can be
asserted by the subsidiary, its minority owners, or a creditor if it cannot obtain
satisfaction.MI If the subsidiary files for bankruptcy and proceedings are
instituted, the claim will be brought by the liquidator. However, if bankruptcy
proceedings are not continued, 2 payments by the subsidiary cannot be
expected. In such a context, the underlying purpose of AktG section 302 which
is to enable the subsidiary to pay off its obligations through the parent's
assumption of losses is no longer meaningful. Therefore, AktG section 303,
exceptionally provides a direct claim against the parent.543
Where the subsidiary is wholly-owned, it has been held that a creditor may
bring a direct claim under AktG section 303 even before termination through
bankruptcy proceedings. 5" Arguably, in such a situation there is no need to
protect minority owners, and therefore, a creditor should not be required to
proceed first against the debtor company. In Video, however, the court held that
AktG section 302 was applicable to a wholly-owned company.545 Accordingly,
refernce is made to what has been said in the proceeding paragraph.
After termination of a qualified de facto Konzem, AktG section 303, in
addition to AktG section 302, is applicable and the parent must provide
guarantees for the creditors' benefit if they cannot get satisfaction from the
subsidiary.' 6 Termination occurs, for example, if the subsidiary goes bankrupt."47 If proceedings are continued the liquidator may claim the amounts

537. The TBB-holding has been affirmed by later decisions of the same court. See Case Commentary, 1994
NJW 2980 (a holding by Oberlandesgericht Munich); Case Commentary, 1994 NJW 3244 (a holding by
Bundesarbeitsgericht, the highest federal court in labor law); Karsten Schmidt, Comment, 1994 NJW 446.
538. Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1582, para. b, 1583, para. 1; Vonnemann, supra note 395, at 220.
539. Tiefbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802, para. 2; Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404,
at 3145.
540. Schmidt, Insolvenzrisiko, supra note 161, at 306.
541. A creditor may also seize the subsidiary's claim under AktG § 302. See BAUMBACH, supra note 393,
at m.nos. 27(a), 30(b); DROKE, supra note 166, at 185.
542. This will be the case if the assets are not sufficient to meet the expenses of the proceedings. See KO
§ 204, par. 1.
543. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404, at 3145, para. b; SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 1017.
544. DROKE, supra note 166, at 185.

545. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404, at 3145, para. 3(a). In contrast, the court in Tiefbau did not
answer this question. Tiefbau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802, para. 2. Previously in Autokran, the
court had stated doubts. Autokran, 1986 NJW 188, supra note 404, at 191, para. c.
546. Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1584.
547. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 800, para. 4; Vonnernann, supra note 395, at 221, para. 2.
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owed to the subsidiary under AktG section 302. The liquidator's competence,
however, does not include the creditors' claims against the subsidiary if
fulfillment by the subsidiary cannot occur. Accordingly, creditors have a direct
claim against the parent, independent of the actions the liquidator takes and
deems to be adequate, regardless of whether the debtor company has several
owners or is wholly-owned. 5' 8 Normally upon the subsidiary's default the
parent would provide security and the creditors could then claim their share.
However, in such a situation, the parent's security is no longer helpful because
default has already occurred. Therefore, the subsidiary will not make payments
to its creditors and the parent's obligation to assume the debts is clear. 9
The parent's obligations under AktG sections 302 and 303 exist regardless
of whether its control has caused the obligations and losses of the subsidiary.550
Furthermore, a parent's liability for reasons of qualified de facto domination
cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary creditors. Therefore,
contract and tort creditors both have a claim. 551 However, as stated in Tiefbau
and confirmed in Video, the parent may prove that its control did not cause the
subsidiary's losses. 5 2
D. Summary
American and German approaches to situations involving affiliated entities
are very different. American courts do not draw a clear and separating line with
respect to parent subsidiary relations. Instead, they extend the application of the
rules referred to by the terms piercing the veil and disregard of the entity, as
summarized above.553
Most courts in the various jurisdictions and commentators as well agree on
the circumstances and factors that should be generally be considered in deciding
on a parent entity's liability for its subsidiary's debts. It is difficult, however,
to provide a conclusive analysis regarding a particular case at bar. It is difficult
to predict those factors which a court will deem to be decisive, and it seems
impossible to predict whether they will be sufficient for piercing the veil. From
a creditor's standpoint, this uncertainty is obviously not desirable since a
successful claim based on piercing the veil is difficult to state. Not only must
the creditor show factors such as complete domination, undercapitalization, or
commingling of affairs among parent and subsidiary, but the claim will also
depend on whether it is a voluntary or involuntary creditor and whether fraud
was perpetrated.
In contrast, Konzernrecht, the German law of affiliated entities, in cases of
a contractual or a qualified de facto Konzern, is based on the statutory provisions

548. Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404, at 3145, para. b; Stimpel, supra note 15, at 618; Ulmer,
supra note 261, at 1583.
549. BAUMBACH, supra note 393, at m.no. 30(b).
550. Konzen, supra note 414, at 2986, para. b; Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1583.
551.

DROKE, supra note 166, at 185.

552. Tie/bau, 1989 NJW 1800, supra note 404, at 1802, parn. 3.; Video, 1991 NJW 3142, supra note 404,
at 3144, para. b. This was previously suggested by several commentators. Ulmer, supra note 261, at 1585,
parn. 3; Vonnemann, supra note 395, at 221.
553. Cf supra part mH.C.2.a.iii.
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of the AktG. By analogy, these code provisions are also applicable to a GmbH.
Here, the parent entity's obligations are found in AktG sections 302 and 303.
Thus, the legal consequences are clear; however, there may be some confusion
whether a creditor has a direct claim or may only assert the subsidiary's rights
against the parent. Furthermore, it can be reasonably anticipated if the facts
indicate the presence of a contractual or qualified de facto Konzern.
Less certainty is involved in a de facto Konzem, where the parent
occasionally causes the subsidiary to suffer a detriment in favor of the parent.
This is not because of the relevant provisions in AktG sections 311 and 317,
which provide clear rules but rather because of the practical difficulties
connected with proving such a claim. As has been said in this context, 5 4 a
minority equity owner or a creditor is unlikely to prevail.5 5 Again, a creditor
does not face these problems in a contractual or qualified de facto Konzern
where the parent's liability is assumed, regardless of the plaintiff's status as
contract or tort creditor or its knowledge of the relevant circumstances.
In short, German law in this area provides more certainty than the American
law as to the prerequisites a creditor will have to meet and the ensuing legal
consequences. A creditor finds this process desirable when compared to the
equitable rules of piercing the veil and Durchgriffshaftung which disregard an
entity's legal fiction only exceptionally.
V.

CONCLUSION

American and German corporate law with respect to shareholder liability for
obligations of the entity have both a quite similar and, on the other hand, a very
different approach with respect to individuals as shareholders or members of an
entity. Courts in both jurisdictions follow equitable rules that have no statutory
basis referred to as piercing the veil and Durchgriffshaftung. Under these rules,
in exceptional cases the corporate principle of limited liability is disregarded.
Thus, both legal systems follow the traditional view of so-called entity law under
which each incorporated entity has its distinct legal existence. 56 The factors
deemed crucial for an application of piercing the veil are quite similar in the two
systems. Imposition of shareholder liability occurs most often where complete
control is found coupled with other factors such as undercapitalization,
commingling of personal and corporate assets, and disregard of corporate
formalities.
In contrast to situations involving liability of individual shareholders, the
systems have different means in disregarding the corporate veil in parentsubsidiary relations and in situations of corporate shareholders.5 7 American
courts continue to apply common law rules of piercing the veil, whereas German

554. See supra parts IV.C.2.b & IV.C.3.
555. Indeed, to date, there is no case in this context. The Bundesgerichtshofin ITT did not investigate the
adequacy of a compensation where a GmbH, as a part of a de facto Konzern, had to pay the parent for services
received. ITT, 1976 NJW 191, supra note 404, at 191, para. l(a)-(b). Since all the pertinent facts were not
clear, the court remanded for further proceedings. Later, the parties settled. See DROKE, supra note 166, at
134.
556. Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 285-86.
557. Bonanno, supra note 264, at 152.
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law, Konzernrecht, has a statutory basis that imposes liability on a dominating
entity regardless of a creditor's status or the legal basis of its claim. The United
States continues to adhere to entity law, while German law gives way to the
principle of enterprise law.5 8 This term describes situations where liability is
imposed on the enterprise as a group of affiliated entities, as opposed to an
exceptional allocation of liability to a dominating shareholder under the equitable
rules of piercing the veil.
Both rules of piercing the veil and Durchgriffshaftung encounter criticism
in their jurisdictions 5 9 because they produce unpredictable and random
decisions. Therefore, it is even more questionable whether these rules will
achieve equitable results of justice and fairness in the context of corporate
shareholders. Here, parent-subsidiary relations are not the only issue. Other
circumstances include situations involving huge, internationally incorporated and
operating conglomerates acting in one common enterprise.' 60 Apparently a
creditor cannot distinguish between the various entities and the multiple layers
of limited corporate liability. Additionally, the incorporated shareholder is not
a passive investor but exercises control over the debtor entity. Therefore,
enterprise law in these contexts can be argued,561 albeit
562 limited to its application, has been enacted by the German Konzernrecht.
Although entity law is still the main principle of limited liability in the
United States,5 63 legislators have already implemented laws imposing duties
and liabilities within corporate groups by virtue of factors such as "control,"
Courts have also extended the
"integrated enterprise," or "enterprise." 5"
obligations of dominating entities.56 5 Accordingly, entity law is frequently
abandoned in the context of corporate shareholders. This shift toward enterprise
5
liability has already been demanded by legal scholars Professor Blumberg, 66
Professor Thompson, 567 and as early as 1947, by Professor Berle.5' 6 To date
however, within corporate groups, there is no general shareholder liability in the
United States. Although imperfect,569 the German Konzernrecht, which was

558. Id. at 288; Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 15.
559. HACHENBURG, supra note 9, at Anh. § 13, m.nos. 36-38; PRESSER, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 1-4;
SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 200; Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 361 ("the chaotic
theoretical content of the doctrine"); Nirk, supra note 64, at 444, 446, para. 2, 448, para. 3.
560. Berle, supra note 35, at 342; Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 298, 321, 326-27.
561. WIR 1993, supra note 53, at 197.
562. Blumberg, CorporateEntity, supra note 14, at 366 n.325.
563. Id. at 324-25.
564. Id. at 288-89, 298, 329-45, 355-59 (citing statutes such as the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
Interstate Commerce Act (1982), Federal Power Act (1982), Fair Labor Standards Act (1982)); WIR 1993,
supra note 53, at 197-98.
565. Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 348-55 (citing courts using a standard of "unitary
business"). Piercing the veil is applied more often under federal statutes such as CERCLA (Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980) or ERISA (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974). See PRESSER, supra note 4, § 3.16.
566. Blumberg, Corporate Entity, supra note 14, at 364-75.
567. Thompson 1994, supra note 5, at 35-36, 39.
568. Berle, supra note 35, at 352, para. b.
569. SCHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 793, para. 4, 802 (criticizing de facto domination).
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the first of its kind when promulgated in 1965,570 may be looked upon by other
jurisdictions, such as the United States, as an example.571

570. SCHMIDT, GEsELLR, supra note 9, at 784; Bonanno, supra note 264, at 152.
571. ScHMIDT, GESELLR, supra note 9, at 819.

